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A firm is in a dominant position if it has the ability to behave independently from its 
competitors. Dominant firms strike the attention of many and often lead to mixed feelings. 
Consumers look happy when branding makes life predictable, but grumble when their 
favorable brand raises its price. Policy makers may be proud of their Heinekens, Microsofts or 
McDonalds, but are unhappy if they restrict choices. Rivals of dominant firms might be lucky 
if the dominant firm is a toothless giant, but a predatory tiger scares them off. Dominant firms 
also give journalists plenty to write about, but it can easily get boring (‘yet another Enron 
scandal’). 
  
Ambiguous welfare consequences 
The mixed feelings can be easily explained. It is not clear whether dominant firms are welfare 
reducing or welfare enhancing. There are lots of reasons for that. First, a dominant firm can be 
a successful innovator, typically good for welfare. But it can also be a firm that emerged from 
an anti-competitive merger, typically bad for welfare. Second, some ex post behavior may 
have adverse welfare consequences even when dominance stemmed from innovation. An 
innovator may engage in such abuses as predatory pricing that might well prevent or delay 
subsequent innovations. Third, when dominant firms engage in behavior that might reduce 
welfare (such as predatory pricing), how can such behavior be distinguished from normal 
efficiency enhancing business practices (such as stunting)? Fourth, welfare reductions today 
might be traded off against welfare gains tomorrow (or vice versa), and who is going to 
determine which generation goes first?  
 
What is welfare? 
When we assess the status and behavior of dominant firms using ‘welfare’ as the criterion, we 
do what most economists would seem to find ‘normal’. Yet there are a number of subtle 
discussions behind this presumed ‘normality’. Welfare is an often used notion in economic 
and legal texts, but there are several conflicting definitions. Welfare in the classical sense is 
used in the first welfare theorem, which says that a competitive equilibrium is Pareto optimal. 
The problem is that we are faced with real life markets that do not satisfy the nice properties 
that are required for the first welfare theorem to hold. Most notably, treating agents as price 
takers is simply not on in any real life market, let alone in markets where dominance is an 
issue. So we leave Pareto and general equilibrium aside, and move towards partial equilibrium 
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  1analysis. The two most common welfare notions in industrial economics are consumer surplus 
and total surplus, i.e. the sum of consumer and producer surplus.  
 
Consumer and producer surplus 
Why would one look at consumer surplus rather than to total surplus in welfare analysis? The 
dead weight loss argument is the most straightforward reason for looking at consumer surplus 
(see figure 1). In a simple monopoly setting, total welfare is maximized if consumer surplus is 
maximized and price equals marginal cost. The reason is that maximizing consumer surplus 
implies minimizing the dead weight loss (see e.g. Tirole 1988). Yet there are more complex 
settings in which the two welfare notions diverge. A too simplistic application of the dead 
weight loss argument results in ignoring dynamic considerations which are also important for 
consumers. Consumers appreciate innovation and product choice, but they are not part of dead 
weight loss triangles. How does this compare with the goals of competition authorities? 
 
The early goals of competition authorities, the US and Europe 
It is not obvious that competition authorities (always) strive for maximization of (consumer) 
welfare. In the US, antitrust policy was a reaction to the formation of trusts that concentrated 
economic power. Small firms and farmers complained about the economic power of these 
trusts and lobbied for protection.  
After World War II, competition policy was imposed on Germany by the occupation 
authorities. Germany had known a Cartel Law from 1923, but cartels were not forbidden: they 
just had to be registered. In fact, the Nazis made participation in cartels compulsory and 
thereby coordinated economic decisions and created economic power. The German 
competition law (perhaps as a result of that) stresses economic freedom, and maintaining 
economic freedom may be seen as one of the main goals of their competition law. A strict 
interpretation of maintaining freedom of action would conflict with the efficiency goal.
1  
Within the EC, competition policy is an instrument to achieve the goals of the 
Community: (roughly) the creation of a single market area with a high standard of living for 
all those that live in it. Consequently, within the EC, two goals are usually distinguished: 
market integration and economic efficiency. Note that these two goals may conflict: market 
integration, when interpreted as the prohibition of price discrimination across countries, may 
go at the expense of economic efficiency. 
 
Conflicting goals of competition law 
From above it followed that there are various potential goals of competition law and that some 
goals can conflict. Two cases that are interesting in this respect are UK Distillers and 
Ford/Volkswagen. In UK Distillers, the Commission was upset by price discrimination by the 
Distillers Company for Whisky between France and the UK.  When ordered to end the 
practise, the company simply stopped supplying the French market, leaving prices in UK 
unchanged. In Ford/Volkswagen, the Commission allowed a joint venture of these two car 
makers to produce MPV’s (Volkswagen Sharan and Ford Galaxy) in Portugal, with the 
argument that this created jobs in Portugal and would lead to better integration of Portugal in 
the Community. 
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  2(i) Maintaining  competition, 
(ii)  Maintaining economic freedom, 
(iii) Achieving  market  integration, 
(iv)  Maximizing total welfare, 
(v)  Maximizing consumer surplus, 
 
It is difficult to argue what is the goal of a certain competition authority, although one may 
say that competition policy is guided by the objectives mentioned above. Within Europe, the 
text of Article 81 shows some evidence of the ambiguity. Article 81(1) prohibits all 
agreements between firms that restrict competition, but Article 81(3) exempts from the 
prohibition agreements that are efficiency-enhancing, provided that consumers get a fair share 
of the resulting benefits, hence, in Article 81(1), the goals (i) and (ii) feature (some even 
identify a restriction of competition with a restriction of freedom of action), while in Article 
81(3) both goals (iv) and (v) feature. It also follows, therefore, that a criticism of a decision of 
a competition authority would be justified only if that decision cannot be justified on any 
reasonable combination of the above criteria that could be adopted by that authority. 
One may argue that consumer welfare should be the goal of competition policy. For 
example, Robert Bork has stated “The only goal that should guide interpretation of the 
antitrust laws is the welfare of consumers” (Robert Bork: The Antitrust Paradox; A Policy at 
War with Itself, New York, 1993, p. 405). What can be inferred from official documents? 
 
The Office of Fair Trading’s mission is to: 
 
‘to protect consumers and explain their rights and to ensure that businesses compete 
and operate fairly’. (OFT site) 
 
The European Commission puts it slightly differently: 
 
‘Competition in the marketplace is a simple and efficient means of guaranteeing 
consumers products and services of excellent quality at competitive prices. Suppliers 
(producers and traders) offer goods or services on the market to meet their customers' 
demands. Customers seek the best deal available in terms of quality and price for the 
products they require. The best deal for customers emerges as a result of a contest 
between suppliers. 
Competition policy aims to ensure wider consumer choice, technological 
innovation and effective price competition, thus contributing to both consumer welfare 
and to the competitiveness of European industry. This is achieved by ensuring that 
companies compete rather than collude, that dominant companies do not abuse their 
market power and that efficiencies are passed on to final consumers.’ (EC site) 
 
The Federal Trade Commission in the U.S finally puts is as follows: 
 
‘… enforces a variety of federal antitrust and consumer protection laws. The 
Commission seeks to ensure that the nation's markets function competitively, and are 
vigorous, efficient, and free of undue restrictions. The Commission also works to 
enhance the smooth operation of the marketplace by eliminating acts or practices that 
are unfair or deceptive. In general, the Commission's efforts are directed toward 
stopping actions that threaten consumers' opportunities to exercise informed choice. … 
  3In addition to carrying out its statutory enforcement responsibilities, the Commission 
advances the policies underlying Congressional mandates through cost-effective non-
enforcement activities, such as consumer education.’ 
 
Reconciling consumer and total surplus 
The common element is that (apart from possible other goals) competition authorities protect 
consumers and assume that vigorous competition is the right tool of getting good deals for 
consumers. In theory it is possible to somehow reconcile total surplus and consumer surplus. 
Consumer surplus in the long run comes closer to total surplus than just consumer surplus in 
the short run. Maximizing consumer surplus in the long-run must involve producer surplus. 
Profits are necessary to invest and innovate, and are therefore also ingredients in consumer 
benefits in the long run. Of course, this is no hard evidence in favor of consumer surplus and 
one type of nuance is needed. Consumer surplus is only a reasonable approximation of 
welfare if long run effects are taken into account. It is not automatic that competition 
authorities do this.  
 
Empirical evidence of concentration 
The attention that scholars and policy makers dedicate to monopolies, oligopolies and 
dominant firms suggests that there are indeed lots of dominant firms around. It is not feasible 
(at least not at this moment) to test ‘dominance’ per se, but given the (statistical) correlation 
between size (market shares) and dominance, we use concentration tendencies as a rough 
approximation for dominance. This exercise is not to test a certain hypothesis, but to get a 
feeling for numbers and trends.  
We start with a discussion of the older evidence (e.g. Maizels (1992), D. Mueller 
(1986)). The international commodity market is dominated by a few multinational 
corporations (Cowling 2002). Concentrated industries also tend to be more profitable, also in 
the long run (D. Mueller, 1986). Of more recent significance is the concentration in the 
communications, IT and media industries. In the USA, in 1985, there were 14,600 
commercial banks. The 50 largest owned 45.7 of all assets, the 100 largest held 57.4%. In 
1984 there were 272,037 active corporations in the manufacturing sector, 710 of them held 
80.2 percent of total assets. In the service sector 95 firms of the total of 899,369 owned 28 
percent of the sector's assets. In 1986 in agriculture, 29,000 large farms (1.3% of all farms) 
accounted for one-third of total farm sales and 46% of farm profits. In 1987, the top 50 firms 
accounted for 54.4% of the total sales of the Fortune 500 largest industrial companies. 
(Richard B. Du Boff, Accumulation and Power, p. 171).  
In the U.K., the top 100 manufacturing companies saw their market share rise from 
16% in 1909, to 27% in 1949, to 32% in 1958 and to 42% by 1975. In terms of net assets, the 
top 100 industrial and commercial companies saw their share of net assets rise from 47% in 
1948 to 64% in 1968 to 80% in 1976 (RCO Matthews (ed.), Economy and Democracy, p. 
239). Looking further, we find that in 1995 about 50 firms produce about 15 percent of the 
manufactured goods in the industrialized world. There are about 150 firms in the world-wide 
motor vehicle industry. But the two largest firms, General Motors and Ford, together produce 
almost one-third of all vehicles. The five largest firms produce half of all output and the ten 
largest firms produce three-quarters. Four appliance firms manufacture 98 percent of the 
washing machines made in the United States. In the U. S. meatpacking industry, four firms 
account for over 85 percent of the output of beef, while the other 1,245 firms have less than 
15 percent of the market.  
Another fact is that large companies tend to become more diversified as the 
concentration levels in individual industries increase. Tobacco companies are the masters of 
diversification. Jell-O products, Kool-Aid, Log Cabin syrup, Minute Rice, Miller beer, Oreos,  
  4Velveeta and Maxwell House coffee are all brands owned by Tobacco companies 
(www.geocities.com). 
More recent evidence points in the same direction. Many European and U.S. markets 
are consolidating in rapid fashion (Schenk 2002, Tichy 2001). Yet, most mergers tend to be 
unhappy
2. Does that mean that the large firms destroy welfare? 
  Whether the concentrations are as bad as some people let you to believe is unclear. 
The mere fact that the merged parties are on average unhappy ex post, does not mean welfare 
is reduced, since the source of unhappiness is unknown. Perhaps they are unhappy because 
competitors reacted fiercer than anticipated. Perhaps welfare was reduced for the merged 
parties but not for their competitors or for the consumers. A priori, the tendencies can equally 
likely point at increased possibilities of exploiting scale and scope economies as at increased 
abuses of market power. It is the duty of Competition authorities to make up their mind which 
of the two prevails. 
 
Persistence of dominance 
So we observed that oligopolies and (near) monopolies occupy large and important parts of 
the economy. Yet, there seems to be a widespread presumption among economists that 
dominant firms have a tendency to decline.  It is important to check in how far this 
presumption is right, since rapidly declining dominant firms obviously affect optimal policy 
responses. To our knowledge Geroski (1987) and Mueller (1986) are the only one to have 
actually tested this empirically. Checking the actual decline of market leaders in the U.K. and 
the U.S., Geroski finds no evidence of actual decline, defined as some mix of incumbent’s 
erosion of profits and market shares over time. E.g. market share based result was that of the 
108 observed dominant firms, 32 did not decline, between 46 and 51 declined 6 percent or 
less (Geroski). However difficult these results are to be interpreted, it shows that there is no 
such thing as systematic rapid decline of dominant firms. D. Mueller (1986) studied the 
largest 1000 firms in the U.S. in the period 1950-1972 and concluded that the typical 
persistently high earning firm has a large market share and sells differentiated products.  
  By lack of stronger evidence, we will employ the working hypothesis in this chapter 
that alert dominant firms, when left untouched by competition authorities, have enough 
possibilities to maintain their position, at least in a non-trivial number of cases.       
  
Policy responses towards dominance: two polar views 
Most of what we have discussed so far is not altogether controversial. Yet when we will 
discuss policy responses to behavior by dominant firms, there is more room for controversy. 
We distinguish two polar views. At one side of the spectrum is what we call the ‘Schumpeter-
visits-Chicago position’. This position takes a relaxed view towards dominant firms, arguing 
that dominant firms are in general good for consumers, create lots of jobs, innovate, and 
exploit scale economies. It typically downplays potential adverse effects of dominant firms, 
suggesting that the adverse effects are temporary and cannot be detected at socially acceptable 
costs anyhow. In the words of Schmalensee: 
3
  
‘Firms may achieve short-run dominance through merger or other actions that are not 
directly productive. But most dominant positions, particularly those created in the US 
after ‘merger for monopoly’ was ruled illegal in 1903, have their origins to an 
important extent in innovation, broadly defined. Firms that attain short-run dominance 
by merger or other means but have no advantages over actual and potential rivals and 
                                                 
2 Schenk 2002 Tichy 2001, Mueller (2001). 
3 Schmalensee is in fact more moderate than the polar position suggests. 
  5are badly managed tend to perform poorly and lose dominance in a matter of years. In 
other cases, dominant positions may take many decades to decay appreciably.’  
  
It comes as no surprise that the ‘Schumpeter-visits-Chicago position’ is also particularly 
worried about possible adverse effects of government intervention. The favorite quotes are 
‘The successful competitor, having been urged to compete, must not be turned upon when he 
wins’ (Judge Hand in the Alcoa case) and ‘enforcement of the US antitrust generally involves 
winner-bashing’ (Robert Shapiro).  
At the other side of the spectrum is what some might be tempted to baptize ‘Old 
Europe’. Here the aim is to ‘chase the villains’. It finds supporters among a number of 
regulators, competition authorities, politicians, anti-globalists and some academic scholars. In 
the words of Cowling (2002):
4
 
‘We can conclude at this point that oligopolistic structures generally prevail at some 
stage of the global production process: obviously a myriad small production units 
exist, but they exist within a system dominated by relatively few giants. The 
implication is that we can expect a general divergence of prices from the competitive 
level. We shall now assess theoretical grounds and empirical evidence for the 
significance of this divergence, the factors underlying it and the consequences for 
profits, and thus for the broad distribution of income between capital and labour.’ 
 
At this side of the spectrum there is less worry about dynamic features and government 
failure. The favorite quotes here are from the Michelin case (in 1983 #57) ‘a finding that an 
undertaking has a dominant position is not in itself a recrimination but simply means that, 
irrespective of the reasons for which it has such a dominant position, the undertaking 
concerned has a special responsibility not to allow its conduct to impair genuine undistorted 
competition on the common market’ and Hicks’s ‘The best part of a monopoly is a quiet life’. 
  
Type I versus type II errors 
Differences between the two polar views can be explained by different weights that are 
attached to type I and type II errors. With judge Hand’s Alcoa quote in mind, it is 
unsurprising that the Schumpeter-visits-Chicago-position dislikes unjust convictions of 
innocent firms. This parallels American cultural habits of rewarding winners and ignoring 
losers. Equally so, Old Europeans tend to protect the poor and weak, and henceforth put more 
weight on type II errors. Both polar views seem to have some good arguments and some bad 
ones. Available empirical evidence also produces a mixed ball.  
 
Combining insights from both polar views 
Most economists would adopt arguments from both sides and we are no exceptions. First we 
see no reason to take a relaxed attitude towards dominant firms. There are robust economic 
theories showing that dominant firms have all the incentive and ample possibilities to reduce 
welfare, however measured. There is no indication that dominant firms spontaneously fall 
apart (Mueller, Geroski) nor are there convincing arguments that (persistent) dominance is 
required to innovate.
5 Dominant firms also produce the large bulk of the economy and occupy 
                                                 
4 Cowling is in fact more moderate than the polar position suggests. 
5 Reviewing the literature on competition and innovation, Bennett, De Bijl and Canoy (2002) conclude: ‘It is 
generally true to say that the rate of innovation per firm will increase with competition when the degree of 
competition is not already too severe. … However, increasing the number of firms when the underlying industry 
structure is already monopolistic generally increases the rate of innovation both at the firm level and at the 
industry level.’ 
  6seats in vital sectors of the society such as telecom, banks, electricity, transport and so forth. 
This means that underperformance of dominant firms may also have adverse non-economic 
effects. So these are useful Old Europe arguments. Yet, dominant firms are often firms that 
heavily invest in infrastructure, assets or innovation. A government that decides to intervene 
in this type of market should be aware of the potential consequences of intervention, in 
particular the consequences of making mistakes. As Fisher (1991) has put it in the context of 
monopolies: 
 
“Economists and others ought to approach the public policy problems involved in 
these areas with a certain humility. Real industries tend to be very complicated. One 
ought not to tinker with a well-performing industry on the basis of simplistic 
judgements. The diagnosis of the monopoly disease is sufficiently difficult that one 
ought not to proceed to surgery without thorough examination of the patient and a 
thorough understanding of the medical principles involved.” 
 
A mistake in a market with a lot of dynamics and big stakes is not only more consequential, 
also the probability that a mistake is made is larger than in other markets. A lot of dynamics 
implies more uncertainty, therefore a higher probability of mistakes. Also, the need for 
intervention reduces when markets tomorrow will look different from markets today. As a 
consequence of this, government intervention should be proportionate to the problem, no 
more and no less.  
 
Competition law versus other policy instruments 
Counteracting potential welfare reductions by dominant firms is typically the policy area of 
competition law. Competition law has been designed to prevent serious welfare reducing 
actions by firms, such as cartel agreements, and to punish such actions when they occur. 
Competition law can also block mergers if the merging parties threaten to become too 
powerful. However, competition law has not been designed to counteract all possible welfare 
reducing actions. First of all, for reasons explained above, not all welfare reducing actions 
require countermeasures, and, secondly, legal solutions are not always the best solutions. 
Competition law bears similarities to criminal justice. Villains must be punished, but many 
deviations from optimal behavior by civilians (such as being rude) is best left untouched or 
counteracted by other policy measures than legal actions (such as education). Canoy and 
Onderstal (2003) show in a number of oligopoly cases that policy measures such as entry 
barrier reduction, increasing transparency or reducing switching costs are likely to be much 
more successful than going for collective dominance cases and the like. In terms of type I and    
type II mistakes: In the legal history in the Western world it is commonplace to only convict 
criminals if their guilt is proven beyond reasonable doubt. This puts all the eggs in the type I 
basket. The reason is by and large normative in nature: as explained above, it is felt that only 
serious cases should go to court. For less clear-cut cases other instruments are easier to use. 
Policy makers have much more leeway than judges to do what they think is best. Whether this 
leeway is always used in a welfare enhancing way is of course a different matter. 
 
This chapter further elaborates the welfare consequences of dominance and monopolization 
and possible policy responses to that. First section 2 delves deeper into the different policy 
responses towards dominance. What is the crucial difference between regulation and 
antitrust? Section 3 then introduces single dominance and different types of abuses of 
dominance. Section 4 discusses collective dominance. Section 5 compares legal approaches in 
the U.S. and Europe. Section 6 does the same with mergers. Section 7 concludes. 
 
  72. Regulation versus antitrust 
 
Dominant firms are exposed to various types of supervision. In some cases, as for example in 
the telecommunications industry, they are subject to rather detailed, industry-specific 
regulation. In other cases, they are only subject to general antitrust supervision.   It is 
therefore useful to start this chapter with a brief comparison of “regulation” and “antitrust”; 
several dimensions are relevant in this respect: timing of oversight, procedures and control 
rights, information and continued relationship.  
 
Ex ante versus ex post 
 
An important difference between regulation and antitrust is that the former operates mainly ex 
ante and the latter ex post. Antitrust authorities assess conduct after the fact while regulators 
define the rules for price setting, investment and profit sharing ex ante. Some qualifiers are in 
order, however, since for example merger control often requires notification for large mergers 
and is a quasi-regulatory process.
6
 
Relatedly, ex ante supervision must be more expedient. The necessity not to halt productive 
decisions often puts pressure on regulators and merger control offices to converge on rapid 
decisions. In contrast, the ex post nature of antitrust intervention does not call for a similar 




The uncertainty about the overseer’s decision making differs between the two institutions. Ex 
ante intervention removes most of the uncertainty about this intervention (although not 
necessarily about its consequences); it may thus facilitate financing of new investment by 
alleviating the lenders’ potential informational handicap with respect to this intervention and 
by sharpening the measurement of the firm’s performance. 
 
Ex ante intervention also improves the supervisor’s commitment toward the firm. This 
commitment is desirable whenever the industry supervisor has the incentives and the 
opportunity to exploit the firm’s efficiency or investment. To be sure, competition authorities 
can publish guidelines to pre-announce their policy. However, these guidelines may still leave 
some scope for interpretation, and moreover they need not be followed by the courts. 
 
Finally, ex ante intervention may force the firm to disclose information that it would not 
disclose ex post. It is indeed often less risky for the firm to conceal or manipulate information 
ex post than ex ante; for instance, the firm may know ex post that a lie about an information 
that conditioned some business decision will not be discovered, but it may have no such 
certainty ex ante. Relatedly, an ex ante regulator can ask the firm to collect and organize 
information in a given way; getting specific information ex post may prove difficult if it is not 
planned for in advance. 
 
                                                 
6 See Neven-Nuttall-Seabright (1993) for a relevant discussion of institutions in the context of merger control. In 
the E.U., inter-firm agreements that would fall under Article 81 must also be notified in order to benefit from an 
exemption; however, following a recent reform, these agreements will be dealt with “ex post” from next Spring 
on.  Berges-Sennou et al. (2001) formally compare the prior notification regime with the ex post audit regime 
and stress that the balance tilts in favour of the latter as the competition agency’s scrutiny becomes more precise. 
 
7 In particular, ex post intervention may serve as a deterrent but come too late to act as a corrective device. 
  8A drawback of ex ante intervention is that it may foster collusion between the industry and the 
supervisor. The industry knows whom it is facing while it is much more uncertain about 
whether it will be able to capture the (unknown) overseer in a context in which the oversight 
takes place ex post. This uncertainty about the possibility of capture increases the firm's cost 
of misbehaving. 
 
A second benefit of ex post intervention is of course the opportunity to take advantage of 
information that accrues “after the fact”. For example, it may over time become clearer what 
constitutes acceptable conduct. To be certain, ex ante decisions could in principle allow for ex 
post adjustments that embody the new information; but describing properly ex ante the 
information that will determine acceptability may be prohibitively difficult. 
 
Procedures and control rights  
 
While antitrust authorities usually only assess the lawfulness of conducts, regulators have 
more extensive powers and engage in detailed regulation; they may set or put constraints on 
wholesale and retail prices, determine the extent of profit sharing between the firm and its 
customers (as under cost-of-service regulation or earnings-sharing schemes), oversee 
investment decisions, and control entry into segments through licensing for new entrants and 
line-of-business restrictions for incumbents.
8
 
Regulators’ discretionary power is of course qualified by the many constraints they face in 
their decision making: procedural requirements, lack of long-term commitment, safeguards 
against regulatory takings, constraints on price fixing or cost reimbursement rules (cost-of-
service regulation, price caps, etc.), cost-based determination of access prices, and so forth. 
 
Conversely, antitrust authorities and courts sometimes exercise regulatory authority by 
imposing line-of-business restrictions or forcing cost-of-service determination of access 
prices. A case in point is Judge Greene becoming a “regulator” of the American 
telecommunications industry. In Europe, where there has been a growing interest in essential 
facility and market access issues, the European Commission has tried to develop both antitrust 
and regulatory competences and methods.  
 
There is some convergence of regulatory and competition policy procedures. For example in 
the US, regulatory hearings are quasi-judicial processes in which a wide array of interested 
parties can expose their viewpoints. The enlisting of ‘advocates’ is prominent in both 
institutions and contributes to reduce the informational handicap of the industry overseer.
9
 
There are also a couple of differences, however. Private parties tend to play a bigger role in 
antitrust enforcement than in a regulatory process – indeed, while competition authorities 
occasionally conduct independent industry studies, the vast majority of cases are brought by 
private parties. Another difference is that interest groups are motivated to intervene in the 
regulatory process solely by the prospect of modifying policy while they complain to 
competition authorities or courts either to modify industry conduct (through an injunction) or 
to obtain monetary compensation (e.g., treble damages in the US). Yet another difference 
                                                 
8 For example, in the U.S. the Federal Communications Commission has imposed price caps to limit the exercise 
of market power, while such behaviour would not be an antitrust offence. In the E.U., excessive prices could 
constitute an abuse of a dominant position under Article 82, but so far the European Commission has rarely used 
this possibility.   
9 See Dewatripont-Tirole (1999) for a formal analysis. 
  9comes from the fact that competition authorities have less control over the agenda than 
regulators – courts’ and, to a lesser extent, competition authorities’ activities are somewhat 
conditioned by the cases that are brought to them.  
 
Another distinction between the two institutions is the possible separation between 
investigation and prosecution in antitrust. Regulators conduct regulatory hearings and 
adjudicate on their basis, while at least in some countries competition authorities may have to 
win their case in court.
10 For example, in the US the decisions of the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) take directly effect (except if appealed); in contrast, the Antitrust Division 
of the Department of Justice must not only go to court but it moreover bears the initial burden 
of proof. Regulatory decisions may however be appealed in court, in the same way a court 
decision may be overruled by a higher court.
11
 
Last, while regulators and competition authorities are both required to apply consistent 
reasoning, regulators are mainly bound to be somewhat consistent with their previous 
decisions for the industry they oversee. In contrast, competition authorities and courts must 
also refer to decisions pertaining to other industries – and in common law systems, they must 
moreover take into account other courts’ decisions.
12  
 
Information and expertise  
 
Regulatory decisions tend to rely on superior expertise. While antitrust enforcers have a fairly 
universal mandate, regulatory agencies usually specialize on a specific industry on a long-
term basis. In addition, regulators usually have larger staffs and monitor the firms’ accounts 
on a continuous basis rather than on an occasional one; they can also insist on specific 
accounting principles (such as accounting separation) as well as disclosure rules. 
Superior expertise allows better informed decision making. For example, regulators may use 
cost-based rules for retail and wholesale prices in spite of the difficulty in assessing costs, 
while antitrust enforcers are more at ease with cases based on qualitative evidence (price 
discrimination, price fixing, vertical restraints,...) than with cases that require quantitative 
evidence (predation, tacit collusion, access pricing,...). 
 
Superior expertise may however be a handicap when regulators have limited commitment 
powers. When a firm lowers invests to improve its technology, regulators (or politicians) may 
wish confiscate the efficiency gains – e.g., through lower prices. The regulator’s access to 
information exacerbates this “ratchet effect”, which impedes efficiency. Similarly, an 
excessive attention may inhibit the firm’s initiative. In contrast, an arm’s length relationship 
may entail more commitment power and help provide better incentives.13 
 
                                                 
10 This is for example the case in the US; in contrast, in the EU the European Commission both investigates and 
decides. It is however currently devising ways to disentangle these two aspects, in the line of what has been 
adopted in European countries such as France, where the Competition Council – a jurisdictional entity with 
decision powers – has different bodies in charge of investigations and decisions.  
11 In the case of the FCC, however, federal courts limit themselves to ensuring only that the Commission acts in 
a “reasonable” manner and does not engage in “arbitrary and capricious” behaviour. In contrast, the Antitrust 
Division is not entitled to substantial deference. 
12 The interaction between the two sets of case law is also interesting. The new European regulatory framework 
for telecommunications fosters a convergence of the two worlds and emphasizes for example that regulators 
must use available competition principles.  
13 See, e.g., Crémer (1995) and Aghion-Tirole (1997). 
  10The regulatory agencies’ expertise stems in part from its long-term relationship with the 
industry. But, as is well-known, long-term relationships are, in any organization, conducive to 
collusion. In addition, the need for industry-focused expertise imposes constraints on the 
recruitment of regulators, and natural career evolutions are more likely to involve close links 
with this industry; as a result, the regulators’ expertise may reinforce “revolving doors” 
problems.  
 
This brief overview of the analogies and differences involved in the two types of supervision 
suggests that antitrust supervision by a “generalist” competition agency is best suited when 
detailed regulation is not crucial; in contrast, oversight by an industry-specific regulatory 
agency may be warranted when detailed ex ante regulation is needed, as it may for example 
be the case for access policies.  
 
We now turn to the antitrust policy towards single and collective dominance. 
 





Throughout the world, competition authorities ask the question: ‘How do firms with 
(substantial) market power behave?’, or more specifically: ‘How can firms with (substantial) 
market power exploit this power?’. The economic literature can help answering these 
questions. Indeed, for decades monopolies and oligopolies have filled economic textbooks 
and governments have longstanding traditions in using these theories to design policy 
responses to counter adverse effects of powerful firms. Yet, real-life markets do not always 
behave according to textbook predictions. Assessing monopolistic and oligopolistic behavior 
is complex and cannot be solely based on textbook predictions. 
Over the last decade an increasing number of scholars stressed the importance of 
finding a neat balance between unfettered competition and intervention. As explained in the 
introduction, the laissez fair Schumpeter-visits-Chicago-view stresses the importance of free 
markets and innovation while the Old Europe view points at what can go wrong in free 
markets. Using arguments from both sides, it is perhaps best to scrutinize abuses of a 
dominant position while realizing the potential downsides of government intervention. 
Against this background, this section describes what market power amounts to, and how firms 
can abuse market power.  
 
Definition of single firm dominance 
According to the European Commission official documents dominance is defined as follows: 
 
‘A firm is in a dominant position if it has the ability to behave independently of its 
competitors, customers, suppliers and, ultimately, the final consumer.’ 
 
The crucial words here are ‘to behave independently’. By behaving independently firms can 
mimic monopoly behavior and thereby reduce welfare: 
 
  11‘A dominant firm holding such market power would have the ability to set prices above 
the competitive level, to sell products of an inferior quality or to reduce its rate of 
innovation below the level that would exist in a competitive market.’ 
 
Crucial here are the words ‘have the ability’. A dominant position is a status not an action: 
 
‘Under EU competition law, it is not illegal to hold a dominant position, since a 
dominant position can be obtained by legitimate means of competition, for example, by 
inventing and selling a better product. Instead, competition rules do not allow 
companies to abuse their dominant position. The European merger control system 
differs from this principle, in so far as it prohibits merged entities from obtaining or 
strengthening a dominant position by way of the merger.’ 
 
To punish a dominant firm, one has to show that the firm actually makes use of ‘the ability to 
behave independently of its competitors... etc’. To show that the probability of abuse after a 
merger has increased (significantly), creates a high burden of proof for merger analysis, which 
is by nature ex-ante. That is why it is sufficient to show that a dominant position is 
sufficiently likely to emerge after a merger. 
 
 
The U.S. approach 
The US has a longer tradition of dealing with firms with market power, starting with the 
Sherman Act in 1890, the Clayton Act in 1914 and the Federal Trade Commission Act in 
1914. The motivation of these acts (in particular the Sherman Act) was not to enhance 
efficiency. Rather, the Act was motivated primarily to protect small and medium sized 
businesses.
14 Despite this motivation, the legal practice developed more and more in the 
direction of the ‘efficiency doctrine’, e.g. judges are unhappy to block a merger just to protect 
some small player in the market.
15
The general approach in the U.S. is to outlaw monopolization, attempts to monopolize 
or conspiracies to monopolize. Similar to the dominance doctrine it requires firms to have 
market power. Lots of practices can be illegal (e.g. sabotage, mergers, refusal to deal, tying, 
price discrimination, raising rival’s cost etc)
16, but all of them require firms to have ‘sufficient 
market power’. Since an appropriate definition of market power is: ‘the power to raise prices 
above the competitive levels without losing so many sales that the price increase is 
unprofitable’
17, having ‘sufficient market power’ is very similar to dominance. So we 
conclude that the general approach towards monopolization is not fundamentally different on 
both sides of the ocean. That is not to say that there are no important differences, though.  
The U.S. approach is aimed at preventing monopoly situations. It is less worried about 
actual behavior, once a monopoly has been established. By contrast, the European approach 
forbids various types of conduct by dominant firms. More detailed differences will be 
addressed below as well as in section 5. 
 
Economic models of single firm dominance I: monopoly 
There are basically two different economic models underlying single firm dominance. The 
first one is the most straightforward one: the monopoly model. A monopolist obviously ‘has 
the ability to behave independently of its competitors, customers, suppliers and, ultimately, 
                                                 
14 Hovenkamp, H. 1994 Federal Antitrust Policy, The law of competition and its practice, West Publishing Co. 
15 See also Fox.  
16 See Hovenkamp (1994). 
17 Graphic Products Dist., Inc. v. Itek. Corp. 717 F 2d 1560, 1570 (11th Cir. 1983), see further Hovenkamp. 
  12the final consumer’. It is well-known that monopolies have an incentive to raise price above 
the competitive level, at the expense of consumers. That is, according to the dead weight loss 
triangles in economic textbooks.
18 Indeed, in the most straightforward textbook model, 
monopolies have an incentive to produce less than is socially desirable. There are also more 
subtle ways in which welfare can be reduced by monopolists, such as rent-seeking, lack of 
innovation incentives, X-inefficiencies and suboptimal product selection. These suboptimal 
effects need not occur.  Counter forces include the exploitation of scale economies, the threat 
of potential entry, commitment problems
19 and innovation. 
  Which of these forces prevail is hard to say. Even in concrete cases such as the 
Microsoft case economists tend to disagree on the appropriate economic model and the 
welfare consequences. Nevertheless, some general conclusions can be drawn. 
 
•  In a market characterized with relatively modest scale economies, lack of fast 
innovation and entry barriers, monopolies tend to set suboptimal levels of output and 
price. 
•  Even in the presence of counter forces, such as innovation, monopolies can still reduce 
welfare. 
•  Even if monopolies do reduce welfare, it is neither straightforward nor costless to 
counteract such monopoly behavior.  
•  Whether or not counter forces do outweigh the welfare losses associated with 
monopolies, is context dependent. 
 
Economic models of single firm dominance II: oligopoly 
The second economic model behind single firm dominance is the oligopoly model. Casual 
observation suggests that oligopolies are covered by collective rather than single firm 
dominance, but this is not the case. Take an oligopoly that consists of one large player, say 
with a market share of 50%, and smaller players, say 20%-15%-15%. In such an oligopoly 
two things might happen that might raise concern. The first one is that the oligopolists 
manage to tacitly collude e.g. on price. Here we enter the world of collective dominance, to be 
discussed in section 4. The second concern is if the large firm succeeds in abusing its position 
to unilaterally ‘behave independently of its competitors, customers, suppliers and, ultimately, 
the final consumer’. However, if that is the case, it is not clear which ‘oligopoly’ model 
should apply, since the firm in question apparently behaves as a monopolist. The fact that the 
market structure looks more like an oligopoly than a monopoly seems irrelevant. However, 
this observation denies the importance of strategic interactions.  
What does it mean, in the context of an oligopoly, to behave ‘independently’ of its 
competitors? Section 3.2 provides economic examples of (abuse of) independent behavior, 
such as predation and foreclosure. These examples are characterized by the fact that a single 
firm punishes a (potential) competitor. It can only profitably do so if it faces relatively little 
competition. Competitive forces will make (anti-competitive) price discrimination 
unattractive, which will prevent predation as well as foreclosure. This does not mean that the 
monopoly model applies. Oligopoly theory teaches us how firms interact strategically. A 
dominant firm that attempts to eliminate a rival by predatory pricing has both to predict how 
the prey will react to the prices, as well as to predict responses by future rivals. Hence 
strategic interaction and oligopoly theory are as vital for understanding single firm dominance 
as monopoly theory.  
                                                 
18 See also the introduction. 
19 Such as in a Coasian type durable goods monopoly, see section 3.2. 
  13The use of oligopoly models becomes clear when studying attempts to deter entry. 
Firms with market power who want to deter entry have to play a strategic oligopoly game 
with (potential) rivals. The outcome of such a game determines whether or not deterring entry 
is a profitable strategy. The outcome of the game is influenced by the parameters of the game. 
In a stylized two-period, two-firm model the incumbent firm chooses some variable X (e.g. 
capacity) in period 1. Firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes X and decides to enter or not. In 
period 2 some strategic variable (e.g. price) is set. The parameters that influence the Nash 
equilibrium of such a game are: whether or not the strategies are substitutes (quantities) or 
complements (prices), the level of asymmetry, the level of product differentiation, the 
switching costs etc.
20 So what appears to be ‘monopoly behavior’ could easily be sustained as 
a Nash equilibrium in an oligopoly game. It becomes clear that oligopoly models are vital 
tools for understanding incentives by powerful firms to deter entry. The same applies for other 
types of behavior such a raising rival’s costs or predation (see further next section). 
 There is also another important category of so-called ‘independent behavior’. It is best 
explained in the context of a potential merger in a Cournot type setting. First in the words of 
the Commission: 
 
‘Under certain circumstances, a merger weakens competition by removing important 
competitive constraints on one or more sellers, who consequently find it profitable to 
increase prices or reduce output post merger. The most direct effect will be the 
elimination of the competitive constraints that the merging firms exerted on each 
other. Before the merger, the merging parties may have exercised a competitive 
constraint on each other. If one of the merging firms had raised its price or reduced 
then it would have lost customers to the other merging firm, making it unprofitable. 
The merger would thus eliminate this particular constraint. In addition, non-merging 
firms can also benefit from the reduction of competitive pressure that results from the 
merger since the merging firms price increase or output reduction may switch some 
demand to the rival firms, which, in turn, may find it optimal to increase prices. The 
elimination of these competitive constraints could lead to a significant price increase 
or output reduction in the relevant market.’ (http://europa.eu.int/comm/ 
competition/mergers/review/final_draft_en.pdf) 
 
Put differently: if there are four players playing ala Cournot, a merger between two of them 
will ceteris paribus reduce output and increase price. It is questionable whether this particular 
interpretation of ‘independent behavior’ should fall under the heading of dominance. In 
economic terms this type of oligopoly behavior can hardly be called ‘independent’ since it 
depends inter alia on conjectures on behavior of other players. It is also not related to market 
shares. The same arguments can be used whether or not we are facing a 50-20-15-15 split or a 
25-25-25-25 split of the market. 
It is notable that the Cournot type unilateral effects in oligopolies mentioned above are 
not part of the ‘old’ dominance definition, and hence neither in the dominance definition used 
in article 82 cases. For the purposes of this Chapter we prefer to keep the old definition of 
single firm dominance (with a possible exception to mergers) , i.e. interpreting ‘independent 
behavior’ in a rather strict sense, i.e. excluding Cournot type behavior. 
Concluding, the monopoly model is important for its focus on behavior by a firm that 
faces little (or no) competition. The oligopoly model is important for its focus on strategic 
                                                 
20 Fudenberg and Tirole (1984) provide a taxonomy of entry deterring strategies. 
 
  14interaction. Even if a firm faces little competition, its behavior can easily be based on strategic 
motives, e.g. attempts to deter entry.  
 
What contributes to a firm being ‘dominant’? 
Since it is not clear a priori under which circumstances firms are able to ‘behave 
independently’, there is need for further clarification. The most common legal tool to test 
whether or not a firm is dominant, is the market share test. If a firm has a 40-50% market 
share, then a firm is assumed to have so much market power than it can be called dominant.  
While being practical, measurable and legally accepted, from an economic perspective the 
market share test is too simplistic for two reasons. First, even large players need not be 
dominant. In the case where innovation is taking place at a rapid pace, in the case of fierce 
competition between large players, or strong disciplining by potential entrants, firms cannot 
‘behave independently’. Second, there can be cases where firms have lower shares, say 25%, 
but are still dominant. This can occur if entry barriers are high and market power is reflected 
through other channels than just market share. Arguably, such cases are statistically less 
significant
21, but should not be neglected. 
  The arguably most extreme position towards market power was taken by judge 
Wyzinski in United Sates v. United Shoe Machinery Corp. He claimed that a firm with 
sufficient market power monopolizes ‘whenever it does business’. This position has not been 
followed on either side of the Atlantic Ocean.
22 Instead, firms have to be in a dominant 
position and abuse the position. Why is this needed? There are basically two reasons. First, a 
firm can owe its dominant position to superior past performance, e.g. in the form of an 
innovation. The sheer fact that a firm is in such a position does not seem to be worrying and 
does not warrant intervention. Second, in the case of a natural monopoly, it is cost inefficient 




To cater to the various degrees of market power, in the U.S. the legal practice has developed a 
difference between ‘a lot of market power’ and ‘a smaller amount of market power’. If the 
evidence suggests substantial market power then the courts have identified a certain set of 
practices that will condemn the defendant of illegal monopolization. If the evidence suggests 
lesser market power, then the courts tend to go for ‘attempt to monopolize’ which carries 
stricter conduct requirements
23. In Europe such a ‘sliding scale’ of market power does not 
exist, at least not in a formal legal way. In the U.S. (sufficient) market power and abuse of 
market power are not treated separately. In Europe however there is a rather strict distinction 
between dominance and abuse of dominance. The advantage of the European approach is that 
it starts with a ‘dominance test’, which is relatively straightforward compared to abuse. If 
there is no dominance, there is no case. This creates clarity for firms within a relatively short 
time period. The disadvantage is that it creates a somewhat artificial split between a ‘problem’ 
area and a ‘no-problem’ area, largely based on a market share criterion.
24  
 
Dominance and abuse 
                                                 
21 The bulk of empirical evidence reveals that one is most likely to find dominant firms under the larger ones (see 
Scherer and Ross (1990), Shepherd et al 2001 and many others). 
22 Except of course in merger cases where the creation of dominance is enough to block a merger. 
23 Hovenkamp (1994). 
24 In practice the discussion is not as black-white as suggested here. Antitrust authorities do look at other issues 
as well. 
  15From economic theory we know however that there is not such a clear-cut split. It is not so 
difficult to envisage a heterogeneous goods market with high switching costs, minor 
innovative activity and large reputation effects, to fail the dominance test, but yet being 
potentially problematic, in a welfare sense.
25 At the other end of the spectrum, firms that are 
labeled ‘dominant’, face the restriction that certain types of behavior are almost per se 
forbidden. These types of behavior are not related to the seriousness of the effects of possible 
abuse, i.e. certain behavior that might be abusive is forbidden in a perhaps too mechanistic 
way. As a consequence, if there are competition authorities or regulators who have a tendency 
to over-regulate, labeling a firm as dominant gives opportunities to impose unnecessary 
restrictions.  
The integrated approach in the U.S. gives more possibilities for taking the seriousness 
of effects into account. Yet, the U.S., in a response to fears that expansive applications of 
antitrust may reduce innovation, becomes more and more reluctant to pursue monopolization 
cases.
26 It is also a bit odd to be strict on preventing monopolization (under the assumption 
that monopolies are bad) and yet be relaxed about actual monopolies.  
Concluding, the current E.U. system, while being practical, bears a risk of running into 
type I and II errors, i.e. some dominant firms may escape the attention while some welfare 
enhancing behavior by dominant firms may be punished. The U.S. system is not likely to 
produce type I many errors, but may be too lenient towards monopolization practices.
27
 
A way forward? 
Let us discuss an option that might improve the European situation. There are two problems. 
The first is that the dominance test relies too much on market shares. The second one is that 
possible abusive behavior is treated too mechanistically. A way to solve the first problem is to 
put more economics in the dominance test, which implies that less weight is put on market 
shares and more on other economic variables, in particular entry barriers. Competition 
authorities can have dominance cases with lower markets shares but high entry barriers and 
other problems. On the other side, market players with high market shares (say 60% or so) 
will have the opportunity to argue why despite their high market share they are not dominant. 
The disadvantage of that approach is that it is less predictable and that it may take more time. 
To tackle the second problem, also more economics should be put into the abuse of 
dominance. When a firm is labeled dominant, more economic analysis is needed to underpin 
the forbidding of certain types of behavior (see section 3.2). The reason is that many types of 
behavior that can be called abusive have plausible welfare enhancing interpretation as well. 
Think of price discrimination. It is not clear a priori whether or not price discrimination by a 
dominant firm is good or bad. A recent case in Europe ‘Virgin/British Airways’
28 clarifies this 
point. 
  
On 9 January 1998 Virgin lodged a … complaint against BA's Performance Reward 




                                                 
25 It is not clear though whether the competition law is the best way to deal with these types of markets, see 
Canoy and Onderstal (2003). 
26 See Fox. 
27 This point only holds for unregulated markets. 
28 IV/D-2/34.780 -  Virgin/British Airways 
  16‘criticised the PRS scheme (Performance Reward System: CRvD) for travel agents as 
being abusive of a dominant position.’
29   
 
While the Commission analyzed the scheme in length, it did not make an explicit attempt to 
show that the scheme was actually anti-competitive and that the effects were welfare 
reducing. 
Putting more economics into the dominance test without doing the same with abuse, 
runs the risk of overregulation. Applying more economics into both creates a better balance 
between market and government failure and type I and type II errors are reduced. 
 
3.2 Abuse of a dominant position and monopolization 
 
As explained in section 2, for merger cases it is sufficient to demonstrate that a merger creates 
or strengthens a dominant position. For Article 82 cases it is not sufficient to demonstrate that 
a firm has a dominant position. In the words of the EC, abuse of a dominant position is 
defined as: 
 
‘…anti-competitive business practices (including improper exploitation of customers 
or exclusion of competitors) which a dominant firm may use in order to maintain or 
increase its position in the market. Competition law prohibits such behaviour, as it 
damages true competition between firms, exploits consumers, and makes it 
unnecessary for the dominant undertaking to compete with other firms on merit. 
Article 82 of the EC Treaty lists some examples of abuse, namely unfair pricing, 
restriction of production output and imposing discriminatory or unnecessary terms in 
dealings with trading partners.’ 
 
The U.S. has a list in similar vein (sabotage, mergers, refusal to deal, tying, price 
discrimination, raising rival’s cost etc). This section tries to shed some economic light on a 
number of these potential abuses. 
Firms with a dominant position can employ a wide range of strategies that fall under 
the heading of abuse. The strategies can be grouped in three categories. (i) Strategies aimed at 
deterring entry. The most common examples are strategic sources of barriers, such as 
preemptive and retaliatory action by incumbents, e.g. strategic price discounts, excess 
capacity and advertising. (ii) Strategies aimed at forcing exit of a rival. The most studies 
examples of pushing a rival out are foreclosure and predation. (iii) Strategies aimed at raising 
rival’s costs. Think e.g. of exclusive deals. Notice that the last two groups of strategies can 
also deter entry in addition to harm rivals.  
There is a large literature on each group of strategies, including some general purpose 
articles such as Ordover and Saloner (1988). While much that has been said in Ordover and 
Saloner is still valid today, there are also a number of new developments in various areas. 
This section will focus on some of these new developments. 
  Before we do that, we reiterate that each of the strategies discussed is not an automatic 
abuse, or should not be an automatic abuse. Price cutting, advertising, vertical relationships 
etc are all part of normal business strategies. What has to be shown economically is that 
welfare is reduced by employing a certain strategy. Because welfare is not easily measurable, 
in particular since long run effects have to be taken into account as well, welfare does not 
                                                 
29 Ibid. p12. 
 
  17necessarily yield a practical legal tool to distinguish anti-competitive practices from normal 
business strategies. This difficulty even frustrated a Nobel price laureate:  
 
"Ronald [Coase] said he had gotten tired of antitrust because when the prices went up 
the judges said it was monopoly, when the prices went down they said it was predatory 
pricing, and when they stayed the same they said it was tacit collusion." 
--William Landes, "The Fire of Truth: A Remembrance of Law and Econ at Chicago", 
JLE (1981) p. 193. 
 
We will come back to this question when discussing various anti-competitive practices. 
 
3.2.1 Strategies aimed at deterring entry  
 
Firms can abuse a dominant position (or indeed create a dominant position) by deterring 
entry. While the analysis of entry barriers is crucial for understanding the effectiveness and 
endurance of market power, it is not so easy to isolate entry deterring strategies as a single 
source of abuse. Many types of abuse, such as predation, are based on the notion that future 
entry is discouraged. In fact, it is often a condition to make abusive strategies lucrative. 
Eliminating a potential entrant or a rival today is of no use if there will be a fresh rival 
tomorrow. Still, there are some examples of (strategic) entry deterrence that can constitute an 
abuse by itself. 
 
Strategic entry barriers 
Strategic entry barriers are defined as incumbency actions that are designed to influence the 
behavior of potential rivals. They are effective if potential rivals look to current strategies as 
indications of future market conditions (Gilbert, Handbook). Examples of strategic entry 
barriers are strategic output expansion, preemptive innovation, shelving, excessive advertising 
or excessive product differentiation. These actions have in common that firms need to have 
market power to make it an effective strategy. How does such a strategy work? Take the 
example of shelving.  It can pay off for a dominant firm to wait with the introduction of an 
innovation and "milk" his cash-generating established product, until entry is an immediate 
threat. The dominant firm has to be prepared to counter innovative entry immediately as it 
takes place, that is, he himself has to have the innovation "on the shelve". If entry indeed 
occurs, he puts his new product on the market to take away demand from the entrant. 
This strategy, sometimes referred to as "shelving", is in its effect similar to predatory 
pricing. CPB (2000) provides an example in the Dutch consumer magazines market.
30 New 
magazines are often targeted at creating a new market segment. The launch can therefore be 
seen as an attempt to differentiate products. For a dominant firm, launching a new magazine 
can be less attractive if, in the face of stagnant advertising budgets and consumer demand for 
magazines, it dilutes its circulation and advertising revenues. However, if a new firm enters 
the market with a "new format" magazine, it may be rational for the established publisher to 
bring a similar magazine to the market and drive the rival out of the market.  
In contrast to predatory pricing, "predatory product imitation" need not be based on 
charging a price that is lower than, in the extreme, the entrants’ marginal cost. It is sufficient 
to launch the imitating and thus substituting product, charge the same price, and steal away 
demand from the new entrant to make entry unprofitable. In addition, there is also a long-run 
                                                 
30 CPB (2000) Magazine publishing: a quiet life? The Dutch market for consumer magazines. 
  18effect. The publisher can build a reputation for retaliating whenever an entrant attempts to 
establish a new magazine. The threat of retaliation may discourage potential future entrants.  
  As said above, it is quite rare to prove abuse of a dominant position without actual 
harming a rival. In Berkey Photo a monopolist’s failure to disclose information about a new 
product was seen as anti-competitive. It is however, far from easy to prove a convincing case. 
However, some practices are easier to use to deter entry than to harm rivals. Rivals have 
invested in sunk costs and are less likely to divert assets to other areas (or even exit the 
market) than potential entrants. It follows that one is expected to find lots of possibilities of 
anti-competitive entry deterrence. Whether this also implies lots of legal cases is a different 
matter. Potential entrants have very bad track records as plaintiffs.
31 ‘Most are denied 
standing. The practices are also generally subtle and hard to identify, and the public 
enforcement agencies are generally reluctant to spend vast amounts of money in litigating 
them.’
32
  Another example from the economic literature is ‘banked advertising’, i.e. firms 
engage in (large amounts of) advertising to scare off entrants (Pepsi and Coke comes to 
mind). In practice it turns out to be virtually impossible to distinguish anti-competitive 
advertising from normal advertising practices. This problem is endemic for strategic entry 
barriers and also holds for other types of strategies such as strategic product differentiation. 
  Concluding, while there seem to be ample possibilities for anti-competitive entry 
deterring strategies, filing suit against them as a single source of abuse is problematic. 
3.2.2 Strategies aimed at forcing exit of a rival.  
 
This category of abusive behavior is the most common, and the most studied in the economic 
and legal literature. Notice that the words ‘forcing exit’ are in fact a bit too extreme. 
Strategies that are aimed at ‘hurting a rival’, with exit as its ultimate consequence, is perhaps 
a more appropriate description. The reason why exit is not a sine qua non is that profits can be 
increased if one hurts a rival to the extent that it becomes a less effective rival. However, the 
strategies discussed in this section should not be confused with ‘Raising Rival’s Costs’ as 
discussed below. Although the difference between the two types of strategies may not be that 
large, there is one clear distinction. Strategies that aim at forcing a rival out require upfront 
costs for the incumbent, while raising rival’s costs does not. 
There are two main types of forcing a rival out, predation and foreclosure. Other 
varieties such as price discrimination can best be grouped under predation, since 
discrimination is only anti-competitive if it is predatory in nature. Both on predation and 
foreclosure there is a bulky literature which we will not repeat here. Instead, we will point at 
some new developments in both areas.  
 
Predation 
The standard historical example of predatory pricing is Standard Oil, which attained a 90% 
market share in part through price warfare. While the Standard Oil case poked up the debate 
on predation, and many predation cases were won between 1940 and 1975, the debate was 
considerably cooled down after the publication of the Areeda-Turner article. The article which 
suggested a standard check on predation based on average variable costs, made so much 
impression on judges that plaintiffs were virtually empty handed ever since. Combined with 
the Areeda-Turner logic were two other developments, one economic and one legal. The 
economic development was the Chicago School logic which argued ‘forcefully’ that predation 
                                                 
31 Hovenkamp (1994). 
32 Ibid, p281. 
  19was not rational and therefore it did not make sense to make a lot of fuzz about it. The notion 
of irrationality of predation remains the dominant legal paradigm in the U.S. until today. The 
legal development was the famous Brooke case in 1993, which boiled down to a heavier 
burden of proof on the part of the plaintiff, because – unlike the earlier days of predation – the 
Supreme Court upheld the lower courts view that the plaintiff had to show that recoupment of 
predation losses was sufficiently likely. 
As forwarded by Bolton, Brodley and Riordan, economic theory has moved 
considerably beyond the simplistic irrationality paradigm and also provides new strategic 
recoupment possibilities neglected in earlier economic theory. These new insights – if adopted 
by the judges as the current state of the art - could very well lead to a renewed interest in the 
subject. 
Let us start by defining predatory pricing. Various causes can result in prices being 
‘too low’. Prices might be too low because firms want to attract customers, i.e. by an attempt 
to create a demand mass for a new or renewed product. On the other hand, low prices can also 
be the result from an attempt by the incumbent to force a rival out of the market. The 
incumbent opts for a short-term loss in order to make long-term extra profits thanks to a 
dominant position.  
Predatory pricing implies that there is a price reduction which is profitable only 
because of the added market power the predator gains from eliminating, disciplining or 
otherwise inhibiting the competitive conduct of a rival or potential rival (Bolton et al., 2000). 
In the short term customers may benefit from lower prices, but over a longer period weakened 
competition will lead to higher prices, lower quality or less choice. The fact that an activity is 
being run at a loss, is not sufficient to establish a case of predatory pricing. The question is 
whether it has an anti-competitive effect. In order to prove the anti-competitive effect of 
predatory pricing, Bolton et al. (2000) propose a five-criteria rule: 
 
1. a  facilitating  market structure,  
2.  a scheme of predation and supporting evidence,  
3. probable  recoupment,   
4.  price below cost and  
5.  the absence of efficiencies or business justification defense.  
 
subnote 1) The market structure must make predation a feasible strategy. A company must 
have the power to raise prices (or to otherwise exploit consumers or suppliers) over some 
significant period of time (dominant firm or small group of jointly acting firms, entry and re-
entry barriers).  
 
subnote 2) Predation pricing and recoupment require that predation is plausible ex ante (i.e. 
based on prediction and extrapolation) and probable ex post (i.e. retrospectively). This means 
that there must be a predatory scheme ex ante under which the predator can expect to recoup 
its initial losses. Using the tools of applied game theory can help to identify economic 
conditions under which predation is rational profit-seeking conduct by a dominant firm. Ex 
post probability is shown by the subsequent exclusion of rivals and post-predation market 
conditions that make future recoupment likely. 
 
subnote 3) At the very least, the losses incurred from a predation strategy must be recouped 
somehow. Should the operator be unable to recoup the losses, because of competition from 
existing or potential competitors, the predation strategy is not viable. Recoupment is only 
possible if there is an exclusionary effect on (potential) rivals, or through the disciplining of 
the rival’s competitive conduct. The most common and straightforward recoupment occurs 
  20when prices rise above the predatory market’s competitive level in the predatory market. In 
more complex settings, recoupment can occur through other channels, e.g. by raising the 
prices of complementary or closely-related services. It is essential that these latter price 
increases should unambiguously be explained by the earlier predatory pricing (see also Cabral 
and Riordan 1997). 
 
subnote 4) In the predatory period, prices should be below average variable cost, although 
also prices that which are also above average variable cost but below average total cost might 
be predatory and injure competition. The most- used cost standards are average total cost 
(ATC) and average variable cost (AVC) (OFT, 1999) or long-run average incremental cost 
(LRAIC) as a substitute for ATC and average avoidable cost as a substitute for AVC (Bolton 
et al., 2000). If prices are above ATC, there is no problem. If prices are below AVC, predation 
can be assumed. A price between ATC and AVC is either presumptively or conclusively 
legal. If the price is presumptively legal, there is a need for evidence that the operator intends 
to eliminate or to discipline a competitor.  
 
subnote 5) Finally, there cases can arise where below-cost pricing by an dominant operator 
with dominance might be efficiency-enhancing rather than predatory. However, in such cases 
one has look very closely whether the efficiency enhancement is also to the benefit of the 
consumers in the long term. Otherwise the argument could be abused to foreclose a market on 
the grounds that it is ‘efficient’ to do so. 
 
The five-criteria rule provides a clear procedure how to handle a potential predatory pricing 
case. However, predatory pricing might be hard to prove, particularly the recoupment aspect. 
Bolton et al (2002) provide new economic underpinning for predation to be rational and to 
distinguish it form normal business practices. To sort out the differences between the two they 
suggest to check whether there are indeed plausible efficiency gains as a result of the below 
cost pricing, whether there are alternative means to achieve those efficiency gains and 
whether the efficiency gains are materialized in e.g. higher quality (instead of just higher 
profits).  
 
Bolton et al (2002) then continue to develop plausible ways in which predation can occur, 
using new insights from economic theory. We mention two examples. 
 
•  Financial predation 
 
The argument here depends on capital market imperfections. Investors faced with moral 
hazard and selection problems, tend to favor large firms, at the expense of smaller ones. This 
incumbency advantage can be exploited. When start-ups need cash flow to pay back their 
debts, predators may have an easy target. Cutting prices reduce cash flow and the capital 
market imperfection stimulates predation. Bolton et al show how financial predation could be 
used in a recent cable TV case in Sacramento. 
 
•  Signaling and reputation 
 
The predator can also lower its price in order to mislead the prey into believing that market 
conditions are unfavorable. The incumbent exploits it superior knowledge on cost and demand 
to deter entry or to eliminate a rival. Bolton et al illustrate this possibility by the old Bell case 
in 1879. 
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the plausibility of predation strategies. However, their insights were not uncontested. Elzinga 
and Mills (2001) criticize Bolton et al for being too simplistic and too model specific. Without 
going into the details of this discussion (there was also a lengthy reply by Bolton et al.), we 
conclude the following. 
 
•  Predation can be rational in a variety of settings, and more than previously assumed 
(in particular by U.S. courts), mostly hinging on incomplete information arguments. 
•  It is not clear how serious predation is in practice. Ultimately this is an empirical 
question. 
•  Applying the five step procedure by Bolton et al seems a sensible thing to do, no 
matter how strong one feels on the applicability of economic theory or the empirical 
relevance of predation strategies. 
 
When we look at the European practice, we observe a difference in views again. The U.S. law 
on predatory pricing has been reasonably clear at least since the Brooke Group v. Brown & 
Williamson case in 1993. There the Court held that to be found predatory, conduct must 
satisfy a two-part test: (i) the allegedly predatory price must be below an appropriate measure 
of cost, and (ii) there must be a dangerous probability that the alleged predator will be able to 
recoup its losses through monopoly prices once its rivals exit the market. The European Court 
of Justice has adopted the first part of the Brooke Group test, but has declined to adopt the 
second part, holding that recoupment is not a necessary element of predation under Article 
82.
33 Recoupment seems an essential element of the test because cutting prices in order to 
increase business often is the very essence of competition."
34
The marked difference in approaches between the U.S and the E.U. again reflects 
differences in the view on treating behavior of powerful firms (see further section 5). In 
addition to the recoupment debate there is a second difference. Whereas most U.S. courts 
have held that the appropriate measure of cost is average variable cost, the European Court of 
Justice left open the possibility of finding prices above average variable cost but below 
average total cost predatory if they are "part of a plan for eliminating a competitor."
35  
 
The European Court has stated that where prices are below the average variable cost of 
production (variable costs are costs which vary with the amount of output produced), 
predation should be presumed. The Court held also that if prices are above average 
variable costs but below average total costs, conduct is to be regarded as predatory 
where it can be established that the purpose of the conduct was to eliminate a 
competitor. In these cases a key issue was whether the dominant undertakings were 
covering their costs, but evidence on the undertakings’ intentions was also relevant. 
(OFT website) 
 
The most recent advance in the literature on cost rules is Elhauge (2003)
36, who argued that 
recently, European and U.S. officials have made moves toward restricting firms from using 
above-cost price cuts to drive out entrants. The legal developments most likely reflect in itself 
legitimate critiques on cost-based tests of predatory pricing. Elhauge argues that costs should 
                                                 
33 See Tetra Pak Rausing SA v. Comm'n, Case C-333/94P, [1996] ECR I-5951 (1996). 
34 See W. Kolasky, http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/11153.htm#N_17_ 
35 AKZO Chemie BV v. Comm'n, Case C-62/86, [1991] ECR I-3359 (1991). 
36 Elhauge E. ‘Why Above-Cost Price Cuts to Drive Out Entrants Do Not Signal Predation or Even Market 
Power - And the Implications for Defining Costs’, Yale Law Journal, Vol. 112, No. 4, pp. 681-827, January 
2003. 
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or drive out equally efficient rivals. Elhauge shows that price cuts do not necessarily indicate 
an undesirable protection of market power, but rather can be an efficient response to 
deviations from a price discrimination schedule in competitive markets, and warns for 
harmful restrictions on reactive above-cost price cuts. 
Concluding, while the U.S. practice could win from acknowledging the potential 
rationality of  predation, quite the reverse, the European practice could win acknowledging 
the potential irrationality of setting low prices without the possibility of future recoupment.  
 
Foreclosure 
Another way of eliminating a rival is by foreclosing a market. The standard example is a 
vertically integrated firm with an upstream bottleneck facility and downstream competition. 
The downstream competitors need input from the upstream monopolist to do business. The 
integrated firm may have an incentive to provide the input on such unfavorable terms that it 
effectively forecloses the market. In a less extreme case we have an example of raising rival’s 
costs here. The downstream competitor may not be eliminated but faces a competitive 
disadvantage. Think of telecommunications. An upstream incumbent owns the network and 
provides downstream services as well. Downstream competitors need the network to offer 
services. The incumbent can put its downstream competitors at a disadvantage by offering 
higher network access charges than it charges itself. The competitors may survive if the 
charge is not too high to run them out of business.    
Rey and Tirole (1997) provide an overview on foreclosure. Besides the access example there 
are more forms of foreclosure. Firms can refuse to cooperate, grant exclusivity or price 
discriminate. Similar to other types of abuses, one needs incomplete information arguments to 
make foreclosure a rational strategy. In absence of informational asymmetries the Chicago 
school tells us that it is not obvious how an upstream monopolist could gain by foreclosing a 
(possibly profitable) downstream market.  
The argument to backup rationality of foreclosure is not unlike the Coasian durable goods 
dilemma, in which a monopolist has an incentive to charge high prices early on to attract the 
customers with a high willingness to pay, but then wants to reduce price to attract less willing 
to pay but still profitable other customers. A dilemma exists when willing to pay customers 
anticipate a price drop. An upstream monopolist faces a similar commitment problem. It 
wants to make money on access, but it also want to protect its downstream profits. Each 
additional ‘customer’ adds to its access profits but also increase downstream competition.  
There are several policy responses to foreclosure. Rey and Tirole mention: (i) structural 
policies (divestiture); (ii) access pricing; (iii) access quantity control; (iv) disclosure 
requirements and (v) so called ‘common carrier policies’. 
 
We will not repeat the pro’s and con’s of each of these responses in different settings, but the 
last type of policy requires further explanation. Suppose that ‘upstream’ and ‘downstream’ are 
not based on fundamental technological constraints but on historical coincidences. If an 
upstream monopolist is ‘worse’ (in terms of welfare) than a downstream monopolist (or vice 
versa), a policy option is to change the vertical structure of the market such that the ‘best 
  23monopoly variant’ prevails. Such policies are called ‘common carrier policies’ by Rey and 
Tirole. An example of such a policy is the U.S. gas market reform.
37
The broad implications of Rey and Tirole’s analysis are: 
•  It does matter whether the competitive segment is upstream or downstream. 
Downstream monopolies are worse because they do not have the commitment problem 
described above. Henceforth, in absence of other counter forces, downstream 
monopolies will behave as textbook welfare reducers. Since the same does not apply 
to upstream monopolies, this has consequences for the effectiveness of the 
abovementioned common carrier policy: policy can ensure that consumers do not have 
to deal directly with a monopolist. 
•  Forbidding discrimination by an upstream monopolist can be counterproductive, since 
they bypass the commitment problem (upstream firms not being allowed to lower their 
prices to attract further customers). 
 
Another area where foreclosure plays a role is in the adjacent markets literature. In contrast 
with the literature on direct market power, it is much less clear under which circumstances 
firms can inflict damages in adjacent markets.   
Rey et al (2001) discuss adjacent market foreclosure. In many respect the adjacent 
markets situation resembles the discussion on conglomerate mergers.
 In both cases it should 
be clear that there are a priori less concerns about welfare reducing behavior. This is so 
because firms often have less ability as well as less incentive to foreclose adjacent market (or 
to leverage market power) than they would have in more direct situations. Firms have less 
ability because it is more complicated to foreclose an adjacent market, and –more importantly 
- they have less incentive because foreclosing adjacent markets is often costly. It can be costly 
because it can reduce business opportunities or reduce economies of scale and scope.   
Nevertheless, there remain situations where welfare concerns are legitimate. Firms 
may leverage their market power to adjacent markets, if the adjacent markets are somehow 
related to the market in which the firm has market power. Think of Microsoft having market 
power in the operating systems market. It may use (or: may have used) this power to take 
control of the adjacent Browser market. It can leverage by refusals to deal, by making 
products incompatible, by denying access, etc.  
From an economic point of view, it is important to focus the analysis on a whole 
market arena
38, i.e. including all relevant markets that are related. In the current practice of 
European competition law, the European Commission always starts a merger case or a case 
related to the abuse of a dominant position by delineating the relevant market. When assessing 
market performance on the relevant market, all markets that (strongly) influence behavior on 
the relevant market have to be taken into consideration in order to get a complete picture. For 
instance, the relevant scale of entry may not coincide with the relevant market. In some 
situations, a firm needs to enter several markets before being able to realize sufficient 
economies of scale. If too much emphasis is put on the relevant market, one may falsely 
conclude that entry barriers are low. The market arena consists of markets that are connected 
by important links, such as supply-side relationships (e.g., by operating both markets, firms 
can accomplish economies of scale or scope); demand-side relationships (e.g., a firm sells 
                                                 
37 Before the reform, pipelines (the bottleneck) sold gas to customers (distribution companies, large 
industrial customers) and purchased their gas internally or from independent producers who had no 
direct access to customers. Since the reform, producers can purchase access from pipelines and intereact 
directly with customers. (Rey and Tirole, p18). 
38 Canoy & Onderstal (2003). 
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conduct in the upstream market has influence on the performance of the downstream 
market).
39 Assessing possible abuse of a dominant position by leveraging is easier understood 
in a context of connected markets.  
In which case is foreclosure by leveraging a profitable strategy for a dominant firm? In 
Whinston’s (1990) paper
40 the dominant firm ties its product of market A (where it is 
dominant) to market B (where it is not dominant), so to make the firm more aggressive in 
market B and thereby scares off its rivals.
41 The most important insight in Rey et al (2001) is 
that foreclosing adjacent markets can protect monopoly profits on the ‘home’ market. Recent 
literature provides a synthesis of the older leveraging theories and the Chicago critique. The 
Chicago critique emphasizes that it does not make sense to extend monopoly power to 
adjacent markets, unless the adjacent market belongs to the home market, in which case it is 
misleading to call it adjacent. The new insights work from the hypothesis that the monopoly 
profits on the home market are somehow insecure, e.g. because there is a permanent threat of 
innovation. Think of software or pharmaceutical markets. The arguments are similar to the 
Coasian durable goods dilemma above, albeit in a different way. In the case of an upstream 
market monopolist, the durable goods dilemma makes that the upstream monopolist has less 
incentive to foreclose the downstream market. In the adjacent markets case, the durable goods 
dilemma can be bypassed by foreclosing the adjacent market. 
Concluding, assessing foreclosure requires close inspection on the incentives by 
powerful firms. If powerful firms have the incentive and ability to foreclose a market, an 
attractive policy response is to change the market structure such that the incentives are 
lowered, e.g. by changing the vertical structure. 
3.2.3 Strategies aimed at raising rival’s costs 
 
Raising the costs of a rival (RRC) has the advantage over the forcing strategies discussed 
above, in that it often requires less upfront costs by the dominant firm. A predator must incur 
substantial losses with uncertain future returns. A firm that succeeds in raising its rival’s 
costs, often incurs less costs and may yield immediate returns. Clearly, also the legal rules 
govern RRC should differ from predation, since cost based rules and recoupment do not 
apply. Another interesting difference between strategies aimed at exit such as foreclosure and 
predation, and RRC is that the Chicago critique does apply to RRC. Clearly, if RRC is not 
costly then it must be rational, also in absence of incomplete information. Still, the differences 
between RRC and strategies aimed at exit should not be overstated, since RRC often requires 
firms to make costs as well
42. Many antitrust violations can be interpreted as RRC, e.g. tying, 
bundling, exclusive dealing etc. In the legal practices it is often not explicitly addressed as 
such, although there are ample legal examples of condemning practices that raise rival’s 
costs.
43  
  The economic research to this line of strategies was initiated by Salop in a number of 
papers.
44 Salop and Scheffman identify a variety of RRC strategies, such as refusals to deal, 
                                                 
39 The link should be rooted in the firm’s business operations or in the market’s demand side. Without this 
condition almost all markets are connected. 
40 Whinston, M. (1990), “Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion,” American Economic Review, 80: 837-860. 
41 A similar argument can be made in an oligopoly context with the weaker result that price competition is 
relaxed. 
42 Coate and Kleite (1994) 
43 Hovenkamp (1994). 
44 Salop and Scheffman, AER 73-2 (1983), Krattenmaker and Salop AER 76 (1986). See also Krattenmaker, TG 
et SC Salop, (1996), Anticompetitive exclusion: raising rival's cost to achieve power over price, Yale Law 
Journal, 96:209-93. 
  25advertising and R&D. Scheffman showed that RRC strategies may be much more widespread 
than initially thought and are not restricted to dominant firms.
45 Coate en Kleit (1994)
46, 
argue, on the other hand, that the transactions costs of RRC are often neglected in the 
literature and may well offset its benefits. The most straightforward example of RRC is 
refusal to deal. In the 1927 Kodak case, a monopoly manufacturer of camera firm attempted 
to integrate forward into retail. Accordingly, it refused to wholesale it supplies to other 
retailers.
47 The court ruled that Kodak leveraged its market power to the detriment of 
competitors, and repeated it in a later Kodak (1992) case. From these cases and the other legal 
practices in the U.S. one can infer that convincing RRC cases are rare. While the rationality of 
RRC is beyond discussion, the mechanisms are often subtle, much more subtle than refusal to 
deal. As a consequence, it turns out to be very hard to distinguish RRC form normal business 
practices. 
The arguably most important RRC case was Microsoft, which might also have been 
discussed in the section on foreclosure or predation. In fact Microsoft was alleged to eliminate 
a competitor by a combination of predatory and cost raising actions. Obviously, space is too 
limited to repeat all the discussions on the Microsoft case here.
48 The case was interesting for 
many reasons. From an economist perspective it provides a good test for competition policy in 
the ‘new economy’ and it shows how thin the line is between anti-competitive behavior and 
normal business practices.  
Microsoft has integrated Internet Explorer with Windows Explorer and made it part of 
the operating system Windows which it monopolizes. It has been alleged that, by not allowing 
competitors in the browser market, Microsoft is essentially providing a lower quality 
operating system when used with other browsers than when used with Internet Explorer. Even 
when Internet Explorer is not integrated in the operating system, the exclusive installation of 
it on a new computer by the manufacturer may increase the cost of a rival browser if there is 
some cost (or time or expertise) required for other browsers to be installed by the user.
49
The first discussion point concerned the actual level of market power. Traditional tools 
point at Microsoft having monopoly power in the market for operating systems, but Microsoft 
(through Richard Schmalensee) argued that the relevant scale of competition is the one for 
platforms, not operating systems. Microsoft felt that traditional methods of calculating market 
shares feel short in high tech industries, where competition for the market was as important as 
competition on the market. In contrast to the government, Microsoft claimed that competition 
for the market, i.e. potential competition from innovators, was vigorous. 
Although many economists would agree that network effects and entry barriers make 
that Microsoft has substantial market power, however measured, there is less agreement as to 
the question whether Microsoft has actually used this power to the detriment of consumers. 
The central role in answering this question is played by so-called Middleware. Obviously, a 
competitor to Microsoft’s operating system cannot offer the full Office product line without 
incurring a prohibitively large amount of sunk costs. Middleware is written on top of 
Windows and does not suffer from this problem. A wide-scale adoption of middleware would 
imply that Microsoft cannot exploit its market power which it has from its operating system. 
                                                 
45 Scheffman The antitrust Bulletin Spring 1992. 
46 Coate M and Kleit (1994) ‘Exclusion, Collusion, or Confusion?: The Underpinnings of Raising Rival’s' 
Costs,", Research in Law and Economics, 16 (1994) 73-93. 
47 Eastman Kodak Co. vs. Southern Photo Materials Co. 
48 See e.g. John Hogan (2001), ‘Competition Policy for Computer Software Markets’ Journal of Information, 
Law and Technology, Economides IJIO 1999, Rey, Tirole and Seabright (2000). Richard J. Gilbert and Michael 
L. Katz February 2001 An Economist's Guide to U.S. v. Microsoft. Journal of Economic Perspectives 15, 25-44. 
49 Economides 
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Microsoft used contractual arrangements to exclude competitors. 
50 An example of such a 
contractual arrangement is an arrangement between Microsoft and an Internet service provider 
(ISP), in which the ISP was granted favorable terms. In return the ISP agreed to deny its 
subscribers access to competing Browsers. The reason why subscribers buy such an 
‘unfavorable contract’ is that there exists an external effect, i.e. individual buyers do not feel 
the reduction of competition effect, since their individual purchases contributes in a negligible 
way to that.
51 Clearly, without counter forces, such practices are harmful for consumers. What 
are the possible counter forces? There are potentially three counter forces. The first one is that 
Microsoft may have raised the cost of an inefficient rival, which could be welfare 
enhancing.
52 The second one is that exclusive deals can enhance efficiency. In particular in 
potential hold up situations, exclusive deals can increase relation specific investments. The 
third counter force is innovation. An exclusive arrangement with an Intern content provider 
can spur innovation since it can trigger complementary investments by those providers.
53
Since theory provides ambiguous welfare consequences to exclusive deals, the 
antitrust authority has to verify the specific details of the Microsoft case to come to an 
assessment. The complication in the Microsoft case is that long run effects have to taken into 
account. The introduction to this chapter revealed the importance of long run effects in 
general, but in an innovation driven market, the long run effects are even more important than 
they are otherwise. The difficulties of making accurate long term predictions in the Microsoft 
case are (i) long term predictions in innovation driven markets are notoriously difficult; (ii) 
the theoretical linkages between competition and innovation and between innovation and 
welfare are ambiguous. Clearly, delving deeper into the details of the case reveals that there 
are a number of welfare enhancing features (free Browsers, single standard, some welfare 
enhancing innovation spurs) but also some welfare reductions (lack of choice, higher prices 
for Windows, reputation effects on aggressive conduct). How should one add these welfare 
effects? To quantify them is a tall order indeed, involves among other things weighing short 
term and long term effects and quantifying highly complex uncertainty issues. It is therefore 
unsurprising to find legal and economic scholars on both sides. Concluding, the Microsoft 
case neatly showed the difficulty of abuse of dominance (or monopolization) cases. Elements 
of subjective judgment will always play a part.  
Reviewing the literature on RRC reveals similarities to the previous abuse cases. 
There are lots of convincing economic examples of profitable ways of RRC, as they are of 
predation or foreclosure. New economic insights reveal an enlarged set of possibilities for a 
firm to profitably raise its rival’s costs. Yet, the mechanisms are often rather subtle and cannot 
be easily distinguished from normal business practices. Therefore, the legal successes of 




There is one fundamental difference between EU and US approaches towards 
monopolization. While competition authorities at both sides of the ocean are concerned with 
anti-competitive practices by firms with large market power, the U.S. is mainly concerned 
with preventing a market structure where such practices are likely, while the E.U. also fights 
the practices per se. 
                                                 
50 US vs Microsoft 1998, para 75-102. 
51 Rasmussen, Ramseyer and Wiley, 1991, Segal and Whinston, 2000.Naked Exclusion: Comment AER. 
52 See e.g. Boone (2003).  
53 Indeed, Judge Jackson concluded that these types of arrangements were not anti-competitive. 
  27  The main forms of abuse are grouped in three categories: (i) Strategies aimed 
at deterring entry. The most common examples are strategic sources of barriers, such as 
preemptive and retaliatory action by incumbents; (ii) strategies aimed at forcing exit of a rival, 
with the main examples foreclosure and predation; (iii) strategies aimed at raising rival’s 
costs, e.g. of exclusive deals. 
  All categories share the fact that it is hard to distinguish anti-competitive 
strategies from normal business strategies. Since intervention in abuse cases is associated with 
social costs as well (time, government failure), some caution is needed. On the other hand, 







4. Dominance through collusion
54
 
Even when no single firm enjoys a dominant position, firms may collectively exert a market 
power similar to that of a dominant firm. This will in particular be the case when firms 
coordinate their decision through some form of collusion.  
 
There is a rather general consensus – at least in practice – that naked collusion, be it in the 
form of horizontal price –fixing or market-sharing agreements, should be forbidden.
55 
Unfortunately, it does not suffice to “forbid” collusion, since it can be “implicit” rather than 
“explicit”. Explicit collusion, where firms engage in written or oral agreements, organise 
meetings to design and implement collusive mechanisms, and so forth, are indeed caught by 
Article 81 in the EU and by Section 1 of the Sherman Act in the US – provided that the 
appropriate evidence is recovered. But implicit collusion does not involve any explicit 
agreement; it arises instead from the mere repetition of competitive interactions. In the EU, 
the concept of collective dominance provides however a basis for antitrust intervention in 
such cases; similarly, in the US collusion is accounted for through the concept of “coordinated 
effects” in the context of merger control.  
 
This section discusses the scope for antitrust intervention against such tacit collusion. We first 
study the circumstances in which collusion can arise, and the forms it can take, before 
discussing the alternative courses of action available to competition authorities.  
 
4.1 Relevant factors for tacit collusion 
 
                                                 
54 This section borrows from joint work with M. Ivaldi, B. Jullien, P. Seabright and J. Tirole – see for example 
Ivaldi et al. (2003).  
55 Selten (1984) points out that tough price competition may discourage entry; fighting collusion may thus 
“backfire” by reducing the number of market participants – a similar observation applies to investments and 
other endogenous sunk costs, as emphasized by Sutton (1991, 1998). As noted by D’Aspremont and Motta 
(1994), intensifying competition however selects the most efficient competitors.  
Using a panel of UK manufacturing industries, Symeonidis (1999) finds that the UK cartel laws from the late 
50’s triggered tougher price competition and had a strong effect on the structure of previously cartelized markets, 
but little impact on firms’ profits. 
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Tacit collusion may arise when the same firms repeatedly compete in the same markets. A 
firm may then have an incentive to maintain high prices if it expects that if it does not do so, 
the rivals will lower their own prices in the future. Whether firms can in fact maintain high 
prices depends on four main factors: 
 
-  How much each firm gains from undercutting its rivals.  
Tacit collusion is clearly easier to sustain when the gains from undercutting are low. This puts 
limits on the level of collusive prices that can be sustained, since the gains from undercutting 
depend among other things on the price-cost margin and the elasticity of the firm demand.
56 
The degree of product differentiation may thus matter, as well as the nature of competition – 
for example, the benefits from undercutting are typically smaller when firms compete in 
quantities than when they compete in prices. 
 
-  How much such a firm would lose in the future if its rivals retaliate 
The long-term profit loss from a deviation is the difference between the long-run collusive 
profit that the firm would obtain by sticking to collusion, and the long-run profit it obtains 
under the market conditions that may prevail if undercutting occurs. The reaction of firms to 
perceived undercutting of the collusive price is often referred to as “retaliation”, although it 
needs not always take the form of aggressive actions against the firm.  
Indeed, a simple form of retaliation consists in the breakdown of collusion and the restoration 
of “normal” competition and profits. Firms then anticipate that collusive prices will be 
maintained as long as none of them deviates, but if one attempts to reap short-term profits by 
undercutting prices, there will be no more collusion in the future, at least for some time. Firms 
may then abide to the current collusive prices in order to keep the collusion going, in which 
case collusion is self-sustaining. This form of collusion has a simple interpretation: firms trust 
each other to maintain collusive prices; but if one of them deviates, trust vanishes and all 
firms start acting in their short-term interest.  
However, more sophisticated forms of retaliation may inflict tougher punishments and 
thereby allow sustaining higher collusive prices. For example, retaliation may include 
temporary price wars, leading to profits below “normal” levels for some period of time.
57 It 
may also include actions that are specifically targeted at reducing the profits of the deviant 
firm
58. Alternatively, firms may refuse to cooperate on other joint policies (such as joint 
ventures or joint distribution arrangements) or in standard setting processes. The retaliatory 
power of rivals thus depends on market specificity, and determines to a large extent the ability 
of all parties to maintain tacit collusion.  
 
-  How likely is undercutting by the firm to lead to such retaliation 
                                                 
56 At a given demand level, the benefits from a small price cut increase as the price-cost margin or the own-price 
elasticity of demand increase. 
57 See for instance the work of Porter (1983) on the Joint Executive Committee for the rail-roads industry in the 
1880s.   
58 For example, in Compagnie Maritime Belge (case C-395/96P) shipping companies were alleged to charter 
“fighting ships” specifically designed to compete head to head against the ships of a targeted company. 
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collusive profit will be an ineffective deterrent. The probability that undercutting by one firm 
triggers retaliation depends mostly on firms’ ability to monitor each other’s behaviour, and 
thus on market transparency. The extent of publicly available information on prices and 
quantities is thus highly relevant, but other dimensions such as market stability (demand and 
cost volatility, frequency of innovation and so forth) or the degree of similarity in cost and 
demand conditions matter as well.  
 
-  How much the firm discounts future profit losses relative to today’s gains
59 
If firms care mostly about current profits, they tend to focus on the short-term and thus 
“ignore” the consequences of retaliation. They thus have a strong incentive to undercut and 
collusion is uneasy to sustain. The relative weight of current and future profits in the firm’s 
objectives depends among other things on the market real interest rate. Future profits matter 
more with low interest rates, which facilitates collusion. Another key determinant is the delay 
before competitors react, which depends on monitoring and structural factors such as 
adjustment costs, long-term contractual arrangements, and so forth.  
 
These four factors, which determine the sustainability of tacit collusion, in turn depend on 
market characteristics, which can be grouped into three categories. The first category includes 
necessary ingredients for collusion. The second category covers important characteristics that 
determine whether collusion can be sustained. The last category corresponds to characteristics 
that are relevant, although to a lesser extent. 
Necessary ingredients 
 
Some characteristics have a decisive impact on the firms’ ability to sustain tacit collusion. 
These include entry barriers, the frequency of interaction and the role of innovation:  
 
- Entry barriers: collusion cannot be sustained in the absence of entry barriers and it is more 
difficult to sustain, the lower the entry barriers. In the absence of entry barriers any attempt to 
maintain supra-competitive prices would trigger entry (e.g., short-term or “hit-and-run” entry 
strategies), which would erode the profitability of collusion. In addition, the prospect of future 
entry tends to reduce the scope for retaliation, since firms have less to lose from future 
retaliation if entry occurs anyway.  
 
- The frequency of interaction: frequent interaction and frequent price adjustments facilitate 
collusion. As already noted, firms could not tacitly collude if they did not anticipate 
interacting again in the future. Similarly, collusion is unlikely when firms interact only 
infrequently, since the short-term gains from undercutting a collusive price could then be 
“punished” only in a far future.
60 Collusion is instead easier when firms interact more 
frequently, since they can then react more quickly to deviations and retaliation can thus come 
sooner.
61  
                                                 
59 A discount rate R means that the firm weights the profits in period T with a multiplicative discount factor δ = 
1/(1+R)
T. If the firm faces no risk and can freely access the credit market, the discount rate corresponds to the 
market interest rate.  
60 Of course, other industry characteristics such as market transparency, which is discussed below, also affect the 
length of time before retaliation effectively occurs. But the point here is that retaliation will not even be feasible 
in the absence of frequent interaction.  
61 A similar idea applies to the frequency of price adjustments, since retaliation can come sooner when prices 
adjust more frequently. Thus, the more frequent price adjustments are, the easier it is to sustain collusion. 
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Innovation: collusion is easier to sustain in mature markets where innovation plays little role 
than in innovation-driven markets. The reason is that innovation, particularly if it is drastic, 
may allow one firm to gain a significant advantage over its rivals. This prospect reduces both 
the value of future collusion and the amount of harm that rivals will be able to inflict if the 
need arises. If for example the probability of drastic innovation is substantial, the incumbents 
anticipate that their market position is short-lived; they thus put less emphasis on future 
retaliation and are more tempted to cheat on collusion.  
 
Clearly, there is little scope of collusion in the absence of entry barriers, or if firms interact 
very infrequently, or else in innovation-driven markets. Therefore, whenever an industry 
presents one of these features, collusion is unlikely to constitute a significant concern. In 
practice, unfortunately, many industries may not be so clearly exempted. It is therefore useful 
to consider now the key factors that may affect the scope for collusion. In addition, in the 
context of merger control, the above industry features are less likely than others to be affected 




The second group of market characteristics includes key determinants of the scope for 
collusion. These factors include of course the number of market participants, but also the 
degree of symmetry among those participants, the existence of maverick firms, of structural 
links or of cooperative agreements. 
 
- Number of participants: Collusion is more difficult when there are more competitors. For 
one thing, coordination is more difficult, the larger the number of parties involved, in 
particular when coordination is only based on a tacit common understanding of the collusive 
market conducts. For example, identifying a “focal point” in terms of prices and market 
shares becomes less and less obvious, particularly when firms are not symmetric.
62  
There is another reason that makes it difficult to collude with many competitors. Since firms 
must share the collusive profit, as the number of firms increases each firm gets a lower share 
of the pie. This has two implications. First, the gain from deviating increases for each firm 
since, by undercutting the collusive price, a firm can steal market shares from all its 
competitors; that is, having a smaller share each firm would gain more from capturing the 
entire market. Second, for each firm the long-term benefit of maintaining collusion is reduced, 
precisely because it gets a smaller share of the collusive profit. Thus the short-run gain from 
deviation increases, while at the same time the long-run benefit of maintaining collusion is 
reduced. It is thus more difficult to prevent firms from deviating.
63 This impact of the number 
of competitors is likely to be particularly important when there are few competitors.
64  
 
                                                 
62 The idea that coordination is more difficult in larger groups is intuitive but there is little economic literature on 
this issue. See for example Compte and Jehiel (2001). 
63 This insight is valid when holding all other factors constant. The number of firms is however endogenous and 
reflects other structural factors such as barriers to entry and product differentiation.  
64 For example, in the case of an oligopolistic industry where n identical firms produce the same good, it can be 
shown that collusion is sustainable when the discount factor of the firms lies above a threshold equal to 1 – 1/n. 
This threshold increases by 33% (from 1/2 to 2/3) when adding a third competitor to a duopoly, whereas it 
increases by only 12,5% (from 2/3 to 3/4) when adding a fourth competitor. 
  31- Symmetry: it is easier to collude among equals, that is, among firms that have similar cost 
structures, similar production capacities, or offer similar ranges of products. Suppose for 
example that firms have different marginal costs. The presence of such cost asymmetry has 
several implications.
65 First, firms may find it difficult to agree to a common pricing policy, 
since firms with a lower marginal cost will insist in lower prices than what the other firms 
would wish to sustain.
66 More generally, the diversity of cost structures may rule out “focal 
points” for pricing policies and so exacerbate coordination problems. In addition, technical 
efficiency would require allocating market share to low-cost firms, but this would clearly be 
difficult to sustain in the absence of explicit agreements and side-transfers.
67
 
Second, even if firms agree on a given collusive price, low-cost firms will be more difficult to 
discipline, both because they might gain more from undercutting their rivals and because they 
have less to fear from a possible retaliation from high-cost firms.
68 Retaliation is indeed less 
effective when exerted by an inefficient firm against an efficient one, since the ability of the 
former to compete against the latter is limited. 
 
A similar reasoning applies when one firm has a superior product quality, since such a firm 
has less to fear from retaliation. The argument also extends to other types of cost differences, 
such as asymmetric production capacities. Capacity constraints potentially affect the 
sustainability of collusion in two ways. They limit the gain from undercutting rivals but also 
limit firms’ retaliatory power. At first glance, capacity constraints may thus appear to have an 
ambiguous effect on collusion, since they reduce both the incentives to deviate and the ability 
to punish such deviations. And indeed, studies that have focused on symmetric capacities
69 
have confirmed this apparent ambiguity.
70 The impact of asymmetric capacities is however 
less ambiguous since, compared with a situation where all firms would face the same capacity 
constraints, increasing the capacity of one firm at the expense of the others both increases the 
first firm’s incentive to undercut the others and limits these other firms’ retaliatory power. 
Overall, therefore, introducing such asymmetry hinders collusion.
71
 
The most effective collusive conducts usually involve asymmetric market shares, reflecting 
firms’ costs or capacities;
72 thus, while market shares are highly endogenous variables, market 
                                                 
65 See Bain (1948) for an early discussion. Gertner (1994) validates this insight for environments with 
“immediate responses” where collusion is otherwise straightforward to achieve through simple price-matching 
strategies, even in the absence of repeated interaction. 
66 It is for example well-known that the monopoly price is an increasing function of the industry’s marginal cost.  
67 Side-transfers need not be monetary, however. They may for example consist of in-kind compensations or, 
when the same firms are active in several markets, of concessions made in one of these other markets. Still, such 
collusion schemes are not very plausible in the absence of any explicit agreement, and thus go beyond the scope 
of this report. For a discussion of these issues, see Osborne and Pitchik (1983) and Schmalensee (1987).  
68 Mason, Phillips and Nowell (1992) note in experimental duopoly games that cooperation is more likely when 
players face symmetric production costs. 
69 See e.g. Abreu (1986) for a symmetric Cournot context and Brock and Sheinkman (1985) for a first analysis of 
a symmetric Bertrand context, later extended by Lambson (1987). 
70 Brock and Scheinkman (1985) show for example in a linear model that, with exogenously given symmetric 
capacity constraints, the highest sustainable per capita profit varies non-monotonically with the number of firms. 
71 This insight had been hinted at by several studies: Lambson (1994) provides a first partial characterisation of 
optimal collusion schemes in this context. Lambson (1996) shows further that introducing a slight asymmetry in 
capacities hinders tacit collusion; and Davidson and Deneckere (1984), (1990) and Pénard (1997) show that 
asymmetric capacities make collusion more difficult in duopolies, using particular forms of collusive strategies. 
This insight has recently been formally confirmed by Compte et al. (2002), who show that asymmetric capacities 
make indeed collusion more difficult to sustain when the aggregate capacity is itself quite limited.  
72 A more efficient firm will be more willing to collude if it gets a larger share of the collusive profits, but this 
also affects the incentives of the less efficient firms. There is thus a limit to the possible reallocation of market 
  32share asymmetry may provide indirect evidence of a more profound asymmetry that tends to 
hinder collusion. 
 
The intuition that “it is easier to collude among equals” also explains the role of so-called 
“mavericks.” A maverick firm can be interpreted as a firm with a drastically different cost 
structure, which is thus unwilling to participate to a collusive action.
73 Consider for example a 
firm that has a drastically different cost structure, production capacity, or that is affected by 
different factors than the other market participants.
74 Very often such a firm will exhibit a 
market conduct that differs from others, reflecting its different supply conditions.  This firm 
may then be unwilling to be part to a collusive conduct or might be willing to do so only 
under terms that would not be acceptable or sustainable for the other firms. Similarly, a firm 




- Structural links can facilitate collusion among firms. For example, cross-ownership reduces 
the gains derived from undercutting the other firm. Joint venture agreements can also enlarge 
the scope for retaliation – a firm can then for example punish a deviating partner by investing 
less in the venture.
76 For these reasons, collusion is more likely to appear in markets where 
competitors are tied through structural links. 
 
In the absence of structural links, simple cooperation agreements can also contribute to foster 
collusion. As in the case of joint ventures, these cooperation agreements can for example 
enlarge the scope for retaliation, thereby enhancing the ability to punish deviating partners. 
This may be particularly relevant for industries such as the telecommunications industry, 
where competitors need to reach interconnection agreements in order to offer good services. 
These agreements not only enlarge the scope for retaliation, they also have a direct impact on 
the operators’ pricing strategies. Competitors may then design these interconnection 
agreements so as to facilitate collusion.  
 
More generally, firms may alter their contractual agreements, either between themselves or 
with third parties, so as to facilitate collusion. Marketing agreements can constitute good tools 
to that effect. Jullien and Rey (2002) show for example that producers of consumer goods can 
resort to Resale Price Maintenance to impose more uniform prices across local retail markets, 
thereby making it easier to detect deviations from a collusive price. Record companies have 
been accused to market their disks according to simple pricing grids (with only a few 




                                                                                                                                                          
shares and, while this may help collusion, it does not in general restore the same collusive possibilities as if firms 
were equally efficient. The same remark applies to asymmetric capacities: Compte et al. show that giving larger 
market shares to the larger firms alleviates somewhat the tension generated by the asymmetry, but it does not 
evacuate it entirely, so that the scope for collusion is nonetheless reduced 
73 A new entrant can also appear to destabilize a pre-entry collusive during a transition period, until a new 
collusive situation is reached. This is a rather different scenario, where the temporary absence of collusion 
simply reflects a tâtonnement process for reaching a new focal point.  
74 A firm that uses a different production technique than others will be affected by the price of different inputs, or 
the labour cost may fluctuate in a different manner.  
75 See Harrington (1989) for an analysis of collusion between firms that have different discount factors.  
76 Martin (1995) provides a detailed analysis of this issue. 
  33Other relevant factors 
 
Other factors can have an influence on the sustainability of collusion, although possibly to a 
lesser extent or in a more ambiguous way. Among these, the degree of market transparency 
appears to be a key factor. Other factors include product differentiation, the characteristics of 
demand (demand trend and fluctuations, as well as demand elasticity and buying power), 
multi-market contact, club effects or the organisation of particular markets such as bidding 
markets. These dimensions are relevant to assess the plausibility of collusion, particularly 
when the factors of the first two groups do not suffice to send a clear signal.  
 
- Market transparency: collusion is easier when firms observe each other’s prices and 
quantities. Frequent price adjustments give firms the physical possibility to quickly retaliate 
when one market participant undercuts the others, but such deviation must first be identified 
by the other participants. As a result, collusion can be difficult to sustain when individual 
prices are not readily observable and cannot be easily inferred from readily available market 
data. This, in turn, supposes that some uncertainty affects the market: otherwise any deviation 
would be detected by the rivals, who would perceive a reduction in their market share.  
This observability problem has first been stressed by Stigler (1964)’s classic paper, and 
formally analysed by Green and Porter (1984) and Abreu, Pearce and Stachetti (1985): the 
lack of transparency on prices and sales does not necessarily prevent collusion completely, 
but makes it both more difficult to sustain and more limited in scope. 
 
What matters here, however, is not what is directly observed by the firms, but what 
information firms can infer from the available market data. For example, inferring deviations 
from collusive conduct is easier and requires less market data
77 when the market is stable 
rather than unstable. Moreover the delay necessary to obtain reliable data on prices and 
quantities matters, as well as its nature. For example, professional associations sometimes 
publish information on prices, productions or capacity utilisation rates. It first matters whether 
this information is about aggregate or individual data, since in the latter case it is easier to 
identify a deviant firm.
78 The time lag elapsed between the pricing period and the publication 
period is also important. Even detailed information may not help to sustain collusion if it is 
available only after a long delay. 
 
- Demand growth: collusion is easier to sustain in growing markets, where today’s profits are 
small compared with tomorrow’s ones. Conversely, collusion is more difficult to sustain in 
declining markets, where tomorrow’s profits (with or without retaliation) will be small 
anyway – in the limiting case where the market is on the verge of collapsing, there is almost 
no “future” and therefore no possibility to induce firms to abide to a collusive conduct.  
 
- Business cycles and demand fluctuations hinder collusion. This is a corollary of the above 
impact of demand growth or decline. The idea, formally captured by Rotenberg and Saloner 
(1986) and Haltiwanger and Harrington (1991), is that when the market is at a peak, short-
term gains from a deviation are maximal while the potential cost of retaliation is at a 
minimum. Hence, collusion is more difficult to sustain in those times.  
To see this, suppose that demand fluctuates from one period to another and, to fix ideas, 
assume for the moment that demand shocks are independent and identically distributed across 
                                                 
77 For example, in the above hypothetical industry, in the absence of any demand shock firms could perfectly 
detect any deviation by their rivals by simply looking at their own sales. 
78 See for example Kühn (2001). 
  34periods. In this hypothetical scenario, firms know that they face an uncertain future, but in 
each period the prospects are the same; the probability of benefiting from a good shock is for 
example the same in each future period, and likewise for the probability of bad shocks. This 
in turn implies that the amount of future retaliation to which a firm exposes itself in each 
period, remains the same over time. However, in periods where demand is higher than 
average, the short-term benefits from a deviation are themselves higher than average. 
Therefore, in such a period, the firm must trade-off higher-than-average gains from deviation 
against a constant (and thus “average”) level of punishment. Clearly, deviations are more 
tempting in such period and, by the same token, collusion is more difficult to sustain than in 
the absence of demand fluctuations, where both the short-term gains from deviations and 
retaliation possibility would always remain at an average level.  
As fluctuations gain in scale, collusion becomes more and more difficult to sustain, at least in 
those states where demand is especially high. Firms are then obliged to collude “less” (by 
lowering the collusive price) or even abandon any collusion when demand is high. A similar 
analysis applies to more deterministic fluctuations, as for example in the case of seasonal or 
business cycles. There again, undercutting rivals is more tempting when demand is high, and 
the perceived cost of future price wars is lower when the cycle is currently at its top, since 
retaliation will only occur later, thus in periods of lower demand.  
 
- Product differentiation: this factor can have a more ambiguous impact on collusion, since it 
affects both the incentives to undercut the rivals and their ability to retaliate. This is 
particularly the case when product differentiation consists of offering different combinations 
of characteristics, possibly at comparable prices but targeted at different types of customers; 
this corresponds to what economists refer to as “horizontal differentiation”. Such 
differentiation aims at segmenting customers, in order to gaining market power over specific 
segments by creating customer loyalty: a customer may then be reluctant to switch away from 
a favourite brand, even if s/he would benefit from a small price reduction by turning to an 
alternative brand. This segmentation strategy affects the scope for collusion in two ways. 
First, it limits the short-term gains from undercutting rivals, since it becomes more difficult to 
attract their customers. Second, it also limits the severity of price wars and thus the firms’ 
ability to punish a potential deviation. Overall, therefore, the impact of horizontal 
differentiation appears quite ambiguous.  
 
Indeed, the economic work on this issue has shown that collusion may become easier or more 
difficult, depending on the exact nature of the competitive situation (e.g., competition in 
prices versus competition in quantity).
79 Raith (1996) notes however that product 
differentiation may exacerbate informational problems in non-transparent markets. That is, 
even if firms do not observe their rivals’ prices or quantities, they may still be able to infer the 
relevant information from their own prices and quantities. But such inference may be easier to 
achieve when all firms offer the same goods than when they offer highly differentiated 
products. This may be one reason why antitrust authorities usually interpret product 
homogeneity as facilitating collusion.
80
 
It is often perceived that low demand elasticity should exacerbate collusion concerns. The 
elasticity of the demand has in fact no clear impact on the sustainability of collusive prices. 
                                                 
79 See for example Ross (1992) and Martin (1993). 
80 Product differentiation also hurts collusion when one firm has a “better product” than the others (what 
economists refer to as “vertical differentiation”).  In essence, the analysis is then similar to that of asymmetric 
costs. A firm that has a better quality (possibly adjusted for the cost) is in a situation somewhat reminiscent to 
that of a firm that would offer the same quality as the others, but at a lower cost. 
  35For example, in the case of an oligopolistic industry where n identical firms produce the same 
good and repeatedly face the same demand, collusion is sustainable when the discount factor 
of the firms lies above a threshold equal to 1 – 1/n whatever the shape of the demand, which 
is therefore irrelevant. This comes from the fact that demand elasticity (and more generally, 
the shape of consumer demand) affects in the same way both the short-term gains from 
undercutting rivals and the long-term cost of foregoing future collusion.  
 
Collusion is however more profitable when demand elasticity is low. When picking a 
collusive price, the firms must trade-off the increased margins generated by higher prices with 
the reduction in sales that these higher prices would trigger. The industry’s ideal collusive 
price is the monopoly price, p
M, which maximises the joint profit of the firms and is higher 
when the demand elasticity is lower.
81 Therefore, for a given market size, the firms have more 
to gain from sustaining the monopoly price when demand elasticity is low. In that sense, 
demand elasticity may constitute a relevant factor, although of a different nature than the 
factors listed above.
82 In addition, collusion is a larger concern for consumers when demand is 
inelastic than when it is elastic. This is both because the potential for a large profitable 
increase in prices above the “normal” level decreases when demand becomes less elastic, and 




A related factor concerns the countervailing buying power of the customers. If buyers are 
powerful, even a complete monopolist may find it difficult to impose high prices. The 
profitability of collusion is similarly reduced. In addition, Snyder (1996) note that large 
buyers can successfully break collusion by concentrating their orders, in order to make firms’ 
interaction less frequent and to increase the short-term gains from undercutting rivals; more 
generally, large buyers can design procurement schemes that reduce the scope for collusion. 
 
Multi-market contact: it is well recognised that firms can sustain collusion more easily when 
they are present on several markets.
84 First, multi-market contact increases the frequency of 
the interaction between the firms. Second, it may allow softening asymmetries that arise in 
individual markets. For example, one firm may have a competitive advantage in one market 
and its rival can have its own competitive advantage in another market. While a market-level 
analysis may then suggest that collusion is difficult to sustain, multi-market contact restores in 
such a case an overall symmetry that facilitates collusion. Third, multi-market contact may 
allow the firms to sustain collusion in markets where the industry characteristics alone would 
not allow such collusion.
85
 
                                                 
81 More precisely, the monopoly price is such that the Lerner index is inversely proportional to the demand 
elasticity: L = (p-c)/p = 1/ε(p) , where the elasticity is given by ε(p) = pD’(p)/D(p). 
82 The profitability of collusion can in turn influence the firms’ willingness to design and implement practices 
that facilitate the implementation of a collusive action. It can also induce firms to engage in more explicit 
collusion, at the risk of being caught by antitrust enforcement.  
83 The potential harm to consumers is thus the larger, the less elastic is the demand. The impact on total welfare, 
however, is more ambiguous. The reason is that price increases generate less distortions when demand is 
inelastic (see e.g. Tirole (1988) for a discussion of this issue). 
84 The classic reference is Bernheim and Whinston (1990). See also Parker and Röller (1997) and Evans and 
Kessides (1994) for empirical evidence ; 
85 Suppose that two firms compete in one market and face one more competitor in another market. The firms 
could sustain collusion in the first market if their discount factor is higher than 1/2, but could not a priori collude 
in the second market if their discount factor is below 2/3. Yet, they can actually sustain collusion in both markets 
if their discount factor is close enough to 2/3, by giving a higher market share to the competitor in the second 
market, in order to induce that competitor to collude, and using the first market to discipline themselves.  
  36The principles reviewed above apply as well to bidding markets. For example, collusion is 
easier when there are fewer bidders that repeatedly participate in the same bidding markets, 
when the frequency of these markets is high (e.g., daily markets), and so forth. In addition, 
however, bidding markets can be designed in ways that either hinder or facilitate collusion. 
For example, sealed bid auctions generate less information (that is, except if the auctioneer 
reveals the details of all the bids afterwards) than public descending procurement auctions, 
where sellers observe at each moment who is still bidding at the current price. Therefore, a 




Some markets are subject to club or network effects, where consumers benefit from being in 
the same “club” by using the same software or the same keyboard layout, subscribing to the 
same operator, and so forth.
87 Club effects have several implications. They tilt the market in 
favour of a single participant, thereby creating a “winner-take-all” type of competition which 
is not prone to collusion. In addition, club effects create lock-ins effects that reinforce the 
position of the market leader and thus increase the benefits derived from such a position. By 
undercutting its rivals a firm can trigger snow-balling effects that could easily tilt the market 
in its favour and thus obtain a durable leadership position. Club effects therefore exacerbate 
the gains from undercutting the rivals and, at the same time, lock-in effects limit retaliation 
possibilities. Both factors contribute to make collusion less likely.  
 
Remark: Collusion in other dimensions than prices. The above discussion applies as well to 
other forms of competition. Where for example firms compete in quantity or production 
capacity, collusion consists in reducing the production levels below competitive levels and 
retaliation can either take the simple form of reverting to “normal” competition, with higher 
output levels, or involve temporary large increases of competitors’ outputs, in order to further 
depress prices punish the deviating firm. While the nature of competition is different and 
often less intense under quantity competition than under price competition, it does not follow 
that the scope for collusion is larger or smaller, since retaliation possibilities are affected as 
well as the short-run gains of deviations from collusion: increasing one’s production level is 
less profitable, since prices will adjust to sell out the competitors’ output, but at the same 
time, retaliation is somewhat more difficult since the firm can always adapt its output level.  
 
 
4.2 What can competition authorities do? 
 
 
The above analysis underlines relevant factors but does not allow concluding when or whether 
collusion actually takes place. For one thing, there is a multiplicity of equilibrium issue. In 
particular, even if collusion is indeed sustainable, firms may well end-up “competing” in each 
                                                 
86 See e.g. Klemperer (2002). 
87 One important issue concerns the « compatibility » of rival clubs or networks. Club effects are fully 
internalised – and thus become irrelevant – when rival networks are fully compatible. This is for example the 
case in the telecommunications industry, where all operators are interconnected, so that subscribing to one or the 
other network does not affect who someone can communicate with. However, compatibility can be imperfect 
(e.g., some services can be proprietary) and pricing policies can also induce indirect club effects (for example, 
when it is cheaper to call subscribers of the same operator).  
  37and every period as if it was the last.
88  While there is a good understanding of the factors that 
facilitate collusion, this is not so for the conditions under which coordination emerges.
89  
 
Even assessing the likelihood of collusion is tricky. As we have seen, the sustainability of 
tacit collusion depends on many factors – and only some of them can be quantified with a 
reasonable degree of precision. In addition, these factors may go in opposite direction in a 
given industry.  
 
That being said, how what can antitrust fight collusion? There are several possible courses of 
action.  
 
-  Ex ante, competition authorities can prevent the emergence of an industry 
structure that is prone to collusion, by taking into account this concern when 
examining proposed mergers or joint venture agreements. They can also ban 
facilitating practices. 
 
-  Ex post, competition authorities can take steps to fight collusion per se, e.g., by 
uncovering evidence of explicit coordination or by attacking specific agreements 
that again facilitate collusion. 
 




As mentioned, a given market situation can generate multiple equilibria. It is thus impossible 
to rely on theory alone to determine whether collusion is actually taking place. While the 
analysis of the history of the industry may help determine whether collusion occurred in the 
past, it provides limited help for evaluating whether it will occur in the future, and even more 
so if a merger takes place.
90  
 
Thus, it will not be possible to reach a definite conclusion from available market data on 
whether tacit collusion will actually occur as a consequence of the merger or not. The merger 
control office can however address a different and yet relevant question: will the merger 
create a situation where collusion becomes more likely, that is, will collusion significantly be 
easier to sustain in the post-merger situation?  
 
A merger often affects many of the factors that are relevant for the sustainability of collusion 
and it can affect them in ways that tend to off-set each other. The impact of the merger on 
collusion can thus involve a difficult assessment of possibly conflicting effects. Ideally, this 
could be done by building a “meta-model” encompassing all relevant characteristics, but such 
a “global model” would probably not be tractable and thus be quite useless.  
 
                                                 
88 The mere repetition of the “static” or “non-collusive” equilibrium is always an equilibrium (and even a 
subgame-perfect one) of the repeated game. 
89 In this context, it is not surprising that courts are reluctant to tackle collusion cases in the absence of a 
“smoking gun” – see the discussion below. 
90 Past behaviour can however provide some information about specific characteristics of the market participants, 
which can for example be useful to identify whether firms are prone to collusion or of a “maverick” type. 
  38The above discussion provides however a basis for prioritising the relevant factors, with an 
emphasis on the necessary ingredients (high entry barriers, frequent interactions and little role 
for innovation) and on the most important factors (number of market participants, their degree 
of symmetry, and so forth). Understanding the respective role of each factor also facilitates an 
overall assessment when several factors have a role and push in different directions.  
 
Evaluating the impact of a merger on collusion will however remain by nature more difficult 
than the analysis of single dominance. This is also reflected in the more limited help offered 
by quantitative or econometric approaches. In particular, while some successful efforts have 
been made to evaluate ex post the likelihood of collusion in a particular industry, predicting 
the impact of a merger on the future likelihood of collusion appears substantially more 
challenging. If firms were not tacitly colluding in the pre-merger phase, past market data and 
econometric studies can help in assessing key structural parameters but will not provide direct 
information on potential collusive behaviour. But even if there is some evidence on past 
collusive conducts, one has to account for the fact that firms will adapt their conduct to 
accommodate the new environment created by the merger, which again requires some 
prospective analysis. 
Antitrust enforcement against collusion 
 
Antitrust authorities can attack explicit forms of collusion where, say, managers meet, 
exchange information and conclude agreements on prices or market shares. The main 
difficulty in that case is to establish the existence of such explicit agreements and get hard 
evidence that would stand in court. Antitrust enforcement can launch detailed investigations 
and down-raids – and rely on indirect or informal evidence to target likely suspects.  
 
Another possibility is to encourage informed parties to come and provide the needed 
evidence. The interest of this approach is exemplified by the development of leniency 
programs which have already encountered substantial successes, first in the US and then in 
Europe.
91  Leniency programs vary in design and scope: they may apply to companies or 
individuals, provide full or limited protection, concern first informants or be extended to later 
ones as well, and so forth. The performance of these leniency programs also varies,
92 which 
provides some ground for enhancing and fine-tuning their design.
93  
 
In the absence of any hard evidence of explicit agreements, which could be caught in the EU 
under Article 81 and in the US under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, it is difficult if not 
impossible to directly fight collusion per se. There might actually be a debate as to whether 
antitrust authorities should take actions against purely tacit collusion, where by definition 
                                                 
91 In the US, firms bringing information before an investigation is opened benefit from such a leniency program 
since 1978. The EU has adopted a leniency program in 1996, which allows firms that bring information to 
benefit from reduced fines. The Office of Fair Trading in the UK and the recent competition bill in France have 
also introduced leniency programs. 
92 In the US for example, it is only after the reform of 1993 extending leniency to firms that bring information 
after the investigation has been opened (as long as the Department of Justice has not yet been able to prove 
collusion), that the leniency programs became effective. Thanks to this reform, on average 2 cartels are now 
disclosed every month, and the fines often exceed 100 million $ (not to mention jail for some managers). In 1999 
only the Antitrust Division secured more than 1 billion $ in fines, which is more than the total sum of fines 
imposed under the Sherman Act since its adoption more than a century ago. The EU has also recently amended 
its leniency program to improve its performance. 
93 These programs have also triggered a body of theoretical work. See e.g. Spagnolo (2000a,b) and Motta-Polo 
(2000). 
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something that competition authorities and courts are generally reluctant to do. In the US, 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act condemns for example monopolization but not the exploitation 
of market power through high prices. In the European Union, charging an excessive price can 
constitute an abuse of dominant position. Article 82 thus provides a basis under which tacit 
collusion could be attacked. However, building a case on the abuse of a dominant position 
requires establishing dominance, which in this case would amount to prove that collusion 
indeed occurred and, as noted, raises large difficulties both on legal and economic grounds.
94 
Overall, it is unlikely that an abuse of collective dominance case could rely solely on the past 
realisation of prices or market shares.
95  
 
Short of fighting collusion directly, competition authorities can attack those practices that 
facilitate collusion. Thus, for example, antitrust authorities may want to block Resale Price 
Maintenance when it facilitates collusion by generating more uniform prices. In the same 
vein, competition agencies may want to have a close look at marketing practices that tend to 
make the market more “transparent”, in the sense that they allow the market participants to 
infer more easily the pricing strategies of their competitors.  
 
5. Dominance versus monopolization – a legal overview   
 
 
Throughout the world, antitrust authorities aim to maintain effective competition on markets 
by fighting cartels, by constraining the behaviour of firms that are insufficiently disciplined 
by the competitive process itself, and by controlling mergers. In this section and the next we 
look at two jurisdictions, the US and the EU, and at two of these policy domains, i.e. we do 
not look at issues related to agreements and cartels. Although phrased in different terms, 
superficially, the US Antitrust Laws and the EU Competition Laws in these domains appear 
very similar, but here we will focus more on the differences between the two systems. This 
section focuses on the policies with respect to dominance and monopolization, while the next 
section compares policy towards mergers in these two jurisdictions.  
 
5.1 The rules of the game 
 
The Sherman Act, which dates from 1890, constitutes the core of the US competition regime. 
Section 1 of that Act prescribed agreements in restraint of trade, it is very much like Article 
81 EC, and will not be dealt with here. Section 2 of the Sherman Act prohibits monopoly 
abuse. It states: 
                                                 
94 While the past history of prices and market shares brings information, it will not in general provide a definite 
conclusion – even the most advanced econometric models only provide probability estimates. From a legal 
perspective, establishing collusion would involve a standard of proof similar to the high standard established by 
the European Court for Article 81 in its Woodpulp Judgement (1993). The Court basically required to prove that 
no other behaviour than collusion could explain the observed realisation of prices, a rather insurmountable task. 
95 This suggests that a « pure » Article 82 case is unlikely for collective dominance. However, cases could be 
built – and have already been so, see e.g. Compagnie Maritime Belge – on both Articles 81 and 82.  
Competition authorities can also use past behaviour to alert industry “supervisors” about abnormally high prices. 
They can for example provide such information to consumer associations, in order to increase customers’ 
awareness of the problem. In regulated industries, competition authorities can also alert regulators or point to 
deficiencies in the regulatory environment. 
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  “Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or 
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce 
among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony...” (15 
U.S.C §2). 
 
  Note that the offence is monopolization, not monopoly itself, and that two types of 
abuse are distinguished: attempted monopolization and monopolization. Attempted 
monopolization is the use of improper business strategies to attain monopoly status; 
monopolization is the use of improper methods to attain or maintain a monopoly, or to extend 
it still further. Here, monopoly should not be taken literally, the use of improper tactics is also 
forbidden for firms that do not have 100% market share; what matters is whether the firm has 
considerable market power, i.e. the ability to control price. 
 
  
In Europe, “dominance” is the key concept in the two areas of competition policy on which 
we focus. Article 82 of the EC Treaty (formerly Article 86),  which was signed in 1958, aims 
to constrain the behaviour of firms that are not constrained by other competitors on the 
market, it forbids firms to abuse a dominant position. The article states: 
 
“Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the common market 
or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market in so 
far as it may affect trade between Member States. 
  
Such abuse may, in particular, consist in: 
 
a)  directly or indirectly impose unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading 
conditions;  
b)  limiting production, markets or technological development to the prejudice of 
consumers; 
c)  applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties,  
thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; 
d)  making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of 
supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, 
have no connection with the subject of such contracts.” 
 
These articles raise the questions whether a dominant position should be interpreted as a 
(near) monopoly, whether monopolization should be interpreted similarly to abusing a 
dominant position, and how to deal with combined monopolization, respectively joint 
dominance. We will discuss these issues in turn.  
 
Before going into differences, let us, however, stress the similarity in procedures that are used 
in both jurisdictions. In the US, as well as in Europe, antitrust analysis starts with the 
identification of the relevant market and the competitive situation on that market: both 
dominance and monopoly refer to a certain relevant market. The Notice on the Definition of 
the Relevant Market, which has been published by the European Commission, gives a good 
description of how that market is identified. It also shows how economic thinking, as 
represented by the SSNIP-test, which originated in US antitrust practise, influences policy 
making . In this respect, it is interesting to note that both the authorities in the US and those in 
Europe have been criticised for having identified an aftermarket (i.e. the market for 
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even in cases where the durable product itself is offered on a market with effective 
competition, see Kodak , Hugin  and Hilti.  It will be clear that the issue of whether “locked-
in” consumers should receive special protection is a controversial issue. In Europe, the next 
step in the procedure is to see whether there is a position of dominance on that market, where 
after it is studied whether that position has been abused by a certain business strategy. In the 
US, the procedure is roughly similar, but there is somewhat less emphasis on the second step, 
as we will explain below. In any case, the tests and economic theories that are used in the 
third step are similar, although different weights may be attached to them. 
 
5.2  Dominance, monopoly and market power   
 
In cases that come under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, after having identified the relevant 
market, the authorities next investigate whether the firm in question has attained monopoly 
status. Typically, if the market share is about 75 percent or more, that is said to be the case. In 
the third step, the behaviour in question is investigated. Here, the distinction between “attempt 
to monopolize” and “monopolization” is relevant. As in actual antitrust practise, emphasis is 
on the behaviour and not on the status of the firm, we defer that discussion to section 6.2. 
 
Individual dominance  
 
In contrast, in Europe relatively much importance is attached to the status of the firm: is it 
dominant or not? In one of the early cases arising out of Article 82, United Brands,  the ECJ 
(the European Court of Justice) gave a definition of dominance that it has frequently relied 
upon since. One year later, in Hoffmann-La Roche,  the ECJ somewhat refined that earlier 
definition, and that definition still stands today: 
 
“38. The dominant position thus referred to relates to a position of economic strength enjoyed 
by an undertaking which enables it to prevent effective competition being maintained on the 
relevant market by affording it the power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of 
its competitors, its customers and ultimately of it consumers. 
 
39. Such a position does not preclude some competition, which it does where there is a 
monopoly or a quasi-monopoly, but enables the undertaking which profits by it, if not to 
determine, at least to have an appreciable influence on the conditions under which that 
competition will develop, and in any case to act largely in disregard of it so long as such 
conduct does not operate to its detriment.” 
 
The reader notices that this definition has two elements to it. First, the dominant firm is able 
to behave (to an appreciable extent) independently of others; secondly the dominant firm is 
able (to an appreciable extent) to influence how competition on the market will develop. 
While the definition is not one that one finds in economics textbooks, the second element 
should make it clear that dominance is a broader concept than “uncontested monopoly”: a 
firm that is able to influence the “parameters of competition” may be found to be in a 
dominant position. An economist is inclined to think that a dominant firm is one that has 
considerable market power, i.e. that is able to profitably set price considerably above 
(marginal) cost. Of course, market power is a matter of degree and there is no clear dividing 
line between monopoly and perfect competition. Also note that, in contrast to the SMP-
framework known from the European telecommunications sector,  dominance is not a label 
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sector, there is asymmetric regulation and firms that are classified as having SMP (i.e. 
significant market power) do have special obligations imposed upon them. Furthermore, the 
label “SMP-operator” is assigned in advance, and is withdrawn only by a decision of the 
regulator in charge. In competition policy, a firm is found dominant (or not) in the course of 
an investigation and also a dominant operator “just” has to follow the law. Nevertheless, as 
we will see below, there I some asymmetry: some types of behaviour that would be 
considered “unproblematic” for firms that are non-dominant, are considered to be violations 
of the law for dominant firms. 
 
Market share and market power 
 
In assessing whether or not a firm is dominant, the European Commission and the European 
Court place great emphasis on the market share of the firm. Already in Hoffmann-La Roche,  
the Court held that very large market shares are in themselves indicative of dominance: 
 
“41. Furthermore, although the importance of market shares may vary from one market to 
another the view may legitimately be taken that very large market shares are in themselves, 
and save in exceptional circumstances, evidence of the existence of a dominant position.” 
 
In the case in question, several markets were investigated; when market shares were above 
75%, the Court did not look beyond the market shares; where the share was lower (around 
50%), the Court looked at other factors, such as the market shares of the competitors, and in 
one market (that for Vitamin B3), the Court annulled the Commission’s finding of dominance 
since the Commission had not looked at these other factors. Later, in AKZO,  the Court ruled 
that a share of 50% was a very high market share. We may conclude that, if the market share 
is above 50%, there is, essentially a presumption of dominance. In United Brands,  UBC was 
found to be dominant with a market share of 45%. To date, there have been no cases where a 
firm with a market share of 40% or less was found to be dominant, although the Commission 
has not excluded that possibility.   
 
In both the US and in Europe, the antitrust authorities have frequently been criticized for 
attaching too much weight to market shares and for paying relatively little attention to entry 
barriers. Of course, economists are well aware (for example through the theory of contestable 
markets) that high market shares are, in themselves, no indication of market power. In the 
absence of entry barriers, firms with very high market shares need not have much market 
power. Conversely, firms with relatively small overall market shares may nevertheless enjoy 
high market power in special circumstances. Here, one may think of electricity markets, 
where the ability to influence price is also related to the flexibility of the production 
technology that is employed: if the market is tight and large-scale base-load facilities are 
operating at full capacity, then a small-scale producer that has the opportunity to turn units on 
or off may be able to drive up the price considerably by withholding capacity from the 
market. In other words, market share is a very imperfect indicator of market power and it 
should not be looked upon in isolation: other factors, such as entry barriers and flexibility, and 
the time it takes to adjust competition variables, play an equally important role. 
 
For sure, it is true that the European Commission and the Court do take into account a variety 
of other factors to assess dominance. In addition to the market share of the firm concerned, 
one looks at the relationship between the market share of this firm and those of its 
competitors, at entry barriers, and at whether the firm has a superior technology, or better 
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thinking of the European Commission of the relevance of market shares and other factors for 
assessing dominance is well described in the recent Draft Commission Notice on the appraisal 




Article 82 forbids “any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position”, a 
formulation that leaves room for the possibility that several firms collectively hold a dominant 
position, and that such a position might be abused either collectively or by at least one of the 
firms involved. The question under what conditions firms can be considered collectively 
dominant, that is whether Article 82 can be used to restrain behaviour in (tight) oligopolies, 
has been extensively discussed in the literature. In a couple of relatively recent judgements, 
Flat Glass , Almelo , and Compagnie Maritime Belge  the CFI (Court of First Instance) has 
provided some clarity on this issue. In the latter, most recent, case, the CFI wrote: 
 
“36 (…) a dominant position may be held by two or more economic entities legally 
independent of each other, provided that from an economic point of view they present 
themselves or act together on a particular market as a collective entity. That is how the 
expression ‘collective dominant position’, as used in the remainder of this judgement, should 
be understood.” 
 
To an economist, the wording “independent firms acting together as a collective entity” is 
very much like the definition of collusion, hence, an economist is tempted to interpret the 
above as “firms, in a tight oligopoly, that tacitly collude, may be found to be collectively 
dominant”. While this may clarify the definition of collective dominance, it is not clear, 
however, that this is of much help. For one, having a dominant position is not forbidden, only 
abusing it is. Secondly, since (tacit) collusion constitutes a violation of Article 81, the 
question is: what is the “added value” of being able to classify firms in an oligopolistic 
industry as being collectively dominant? For sure, even if one could perhaps agree that tight 
oligopolies need special scrutiny, it seems that one would not want to classify non-
cooperative oligopolies as holding a dominant position. We will return to these issues in 
Section 7 where we will discuss mergers. As we will see there, the concept of collective 
dominance also plays a role when evaluating mergers, and the term (collective) dominance 
has the same interpretation under the European Community Merger Regulation (ECMR) as 
under Article 82. 
 
5.3  Abuse and monopolization 
 
  The essence of the US-system is that honest, tough competition is never forbidden. In 
other words, whether a business strategy is proper or not does not depend on the position that 
the firm occupies. In this respect, there is a difference with Europe, where dominant firms 
have a special responsibility towards competition on the market. Hence, in Europe some 
strategies that are legal when pursued by non-dominant firms are no longer so when employed 
by dominant firms. Of course, in the US, whether or not the antitrust authorities scrutinizes a 
firm may depend on that firm’s position, but (in theory at least) the classification of the 
strategy adopted does not depend on the status of the firm. Whatever the situation of the firm, 
conduct is improper if it is other than competition on the merits, and such improper conduct 
may be declared illegal if it could lead to monopolization. 
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Somewhat more formally, in the US, unfair business tactics that attempt at monopolization are 
illegal whenever, in the view of the court handling the case, there is a “dangerous probability” 
that the attempt could be successful. Most courts would look at the market power of the firm 
in question to gauge that probability and market shares of around 40-50 percent may be 
indicative of the probability being dangerous, hence, in such cases, the behaviour will be 
scrutinized more closely. The Court will then investigate whether there is “monopolistic 
intent”, i.e. is there evidence that the firm wanted to destroy competition and create a 
monopoly. The evidence can be direct, in the form of company documents, or indirect, in the 
form of business strategies that are only rational when part of a plan to eliminate competition. 
 
What about a firm that already has acquired a monopoly position? We note that, although 
having a monopoly is not illegal, neither in the US, nor in Europe, there is an essential 
difference in treatment in the two jurisdictions. In the US, a monopoly may exploit its 
monopoly position, but such “monopolistic exploitation” is not allowed in Europe. While 
Section 2 of the Sherman act aims (only) at preventing “monopolization” of markets, Article 
82 EC primarily seems to focus on constraining monopolies. Historical factors may explain 
this difference in emphasis. While in the US, the main goal of policy was to prevent dominant 
firms coming into existence; in Europe at one time it was (and, in some circles, it perhaps still 
is) thought that large European firms are necessary to profit from scale activities and to 
successfully compete on world markets. According to this view, competition policy should 
not stand in the way of firms trying to become dominant. In this respect we may also note 
that, in Europe, merger control has become an instrument of competition policy only in 1990, 
32 years after signing the Treaty of Rome, which included provisions for cartels and dominant 
positions, and that, even at present, the policy with respect to mergers is much more lenient 
than the policy with respect to cartels. 
 
Exploitation and anti-competitive behaviour 
 
In the US, just as any other firm, a monopoly simply may not use improper methods to 
suppress competition on the merits, but it is not forbidden to maximize its profits through any 
regular means. This is not to say that regulation of dominant firms does not play a role in the 
US, it certainly does, but it is not done by the Competition Authorities, but by sector-specific 
regulators. In these cases, the monopoly usually does not result from superior 
entrepreneurship, but rather is the natural consequence of technology or the outcome of 
political privilege, hence, in such cases, no special reward is necessary. In Europe, when the 
competition laws were established, there were few such regulators, and perhaps this is another 
reason why more regulatory powers were given to the European Commission. 
  
In the text of Article 82, four examples of possible abusive behaviour are given. One notices 
that the examples all deal with the relation between the dominant firm and its customers, 
where (b) also refers directly to the final consumers. All of these examples, therefore, deal 
with straightforward monopolistic exploitation. In fact, there has been a discussion about 
whether Article 82 only aimed to deal with exploitative behaviour, or whether, like Section 2 
of the Sherman act, Article 82 could also catch “monopolization”, i.e. anti-competitive 
behaviour directed at competitors of the dominant firm. This discussion was at least in part 
fuelled by the fact that the French and German texts of Article 82 speak of “abusive 
exploitation”. The French competition lawyer Joliet, at one time a judge in the ECJ, has 
argued that Article 82 was only intended to deal with monopolistic exploitation, and not with 
preservation of the competitive process, hence, in his view the only aim of the article was to 
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clear for the first time that Article 82 does not only apply to exploitative behaviour, but also to 
anti-competitive conduct which weakens competition that is already weak: 
 
“20 (...) The question is whether the word ‘abuse’ in Article [82] refers only to practises of 
undertakings which may directly affect the market and are detrimental to production or sales, 
to purchasers or consumers, or whether this word also refers to changes in the structure of a 
market, which lead to competition being seriously disturbed in a substantial part of the 
Common Market. 
 
26 (...) the provision is not only aimed at practises which may cause damage to consumers 
directly, but also at those which are detrimental to them through their impact on an effective 
competition structure, such as is mentioned in Article [3(1)9] of the Treaty. Abuse may 
therefore occur if an undertaking in a dominant position strengthens such position in such a 
way that the degree of dominance reached substantially fetters competition, i.e. that only 
undertakings remain in the market whose behaviour depends on the dominant one.” 
 
Since Continental Can, the ECJ has confirmed on various occasions that Article 82 may apply 
to anti-competitive conduct. A particularly clear statement is found in Hoffman-La Roche,  
where the ECJ used a wording that it has frequently used since then 
 
“91 (...) The concept of abuse is an objective concept relating to the behaviour of an 
undertaking in a dominant position which is such as to influence the structure of the market 
where, as a result of the very presence of the undertaking in question, the degree of 
competition is weakened and which, through recourse of methods different from these which 
condition normal competition in products or services on the basis of the transactions of 
commercial operators, has the effect of hindering the maintenance of the degree of 
competition still existing in the market or the growth of that competition.” 
 
The conclusion thus is that Article 82 does not only deal with exploitative behaviour but also 
with anti-competitive behaviour that aims to weaken competition on a market where 
competitive pressure is already weak. In fact, since the Commission has dealt with only very 
few cases of monopolistic exploitation, the European Commission has been unwilling to act 
as a price regulator, the emphasis in Article 82 cases has been on anti-competitive behaviour, 




The reason for the fact that the Commission has dealt with few cases of “excessive pricing” 
probably is that the Commission burnt its fingers in United Brands,  the leading case of this 
type. The ECJ annulled that decision and since then the Commission was careful not to burn 
its fingers again. Of course, it may be very difficult to decide which prices are fair and which 
prices are excessive. Furthermore, if it is found that prices are excessive, then the only remedy 
may be price regulation and this may not be something for which a competition authority is 
well-equipped: it may require relatively many resources, and may not yield benefits 
proportional to the importance of the case; see the discussion in Section 2. 
 
Whether a price is excessive may (perhaps) be determined by comparing the price in question 
with prices of comparable products in comparable markets, but, of course, the question is: 
what is comparable? In United Brands, the Commission adopted this methodology and while 
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Commission. Even if the Commission claimed price differences of about 100%, the ECJ 
annulled the decision on this point. The ECJ also accepted that prices that do not bear a 
relation to the product’s economic value could be excessive, and that a high price-cost 
margin, or high profits might be signals of excessive pricing, but it did not want to commit 
itself to levels. Consequently, there is even now quite some ambiguity about when prices 
should or could be classified as being excessive, see Pijnacker Hordijk and De Vries (2002).  
 
Undeterred by this state of affairs, competition authorities that are new entrants to this game, 
such as the Dutch NMa, which came into existence only in 1997, have shown a willingness to 
investigate claims of excessive prices, with an equal willingness to perform detailed cost 
studies. The methodology used in some of these cases is the usual one adopted by regulators 
in capital intensive industries, such as telecoms: a price is “reasonable” if the return on the 
assets invested is not (much) higher than the return on capital that investors demand, as 
measured by the WACC of the company. One of us has argued elsewhere, Van Damme 
(2001)  that this methodology is flawed and that, in any case, competition authorities should 
only behave like regulators and do detailed cost studies if the dominant position has been 
clearly established and there are substantial entry barriers. After all, absent entry barriers, high 




Moving from exploitative behaviour to anti-competitive behaviour, we note that, in contrast to 
Joliet’s views referred to above, European policy with respect to “anti-competitive behaviour” 
appears to have been more hostile and more interventionist than policy in the US. The above 
quotation from Hoffmann-La Roche raises the question about how to differentiate “normal 
competition” from “anti-competitive actions” and here it seems that the EU-authorities are 
inclined to readily label actions as being “anti-competitive”. In this regards, the Commission 
and the Court frequently refer to the fact that dominant firms have a special responsibility 
towards their competitors and the competitive process. For example, in Michelin  the Court 
stated 
 
“57 (...) A finding that an undertaking has a dominant position is not in itself a recrimination 
but simply means that, irrespective of the reasons for which it has such a dominant position, 
the undertaking concerned has a special responsibility not to allow its conduct to impair 
genuine undistorted competition on the common market” 
 
The Court returned to this phrasing in later important decisions such as Irish Sugar  and 
Compagnie Maritieme Belge.  Note that this quote suggests that even a firm that has obtained 
its dominant position as a result of its own economic strength will have special 
responsibilities and may not be able to use business strategies that would, under situations of 
non-dominance, be unobjectionable. US authorities would not be willing to go that far: one 
may scrutinize dominant firms, but why should one deny them the use of usual business 
practises? Not surprisingly then, the EC-policy has been criticized in this respect; for 
example, see Jebsen and Stevens (1995).  
 
Refusal to supply 
 
It is in cases where a dominant firm refuses to supply an existing customer or a potential 
competitor on the output market, that the difference between EU and US policy most probably 
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business freedom; hence, authorities should be most reserved in adopting such measures. In 
the US, the antitrust authorities have always shown considerable restraint, but in Europe, 
policy has typically been much more interventionist. It is here that the special responsibility 
towards competition that a dominant firm is said to have is playing an important role. Leading 
cases of this type, Commercial Solvents, United Brands and Hugin, all referred to already 
above illustrate this very clearly. 
 
In Commercial Solvents, a pharmaceutical company cancelled orders for a certain raw 
material, presumably expecting to be able to buy it cheaper elsewhere. When the alternative 
supplies did not prove satisfactory, it turned to the original supplier again, but it did not want 
to supply anymore, as it wanted to vertically expand into the end product market itself. The 
ECJ ruled that the dominant producer of the raw material had abused its dominant position as 
its strategy could eliminate all competition from the market. Hugin is essentially similar: a 
manufacturer no longer wanted to supply spare parts to a retailer is it wanted to build up its 
own spare parts business. In United Brands, UBC wanted to punish a distributor for the fact 
that it had participated in a promotional campaign of a competitor of UBC. According to the 
ECJ, the counter-measure of no longer supplying this distributor was not proportional and, 
hence, abusive. It is remarkable that, in all these cases, there is little attention to efficiency 





In some of the refusal to supply cases discussed above, a competitor could not compete on the 
market for some final product if it did not have access to some raw material that is produced 
by the dominant firm. In the case of essential facilities, the situation is similar, but now a 
competitor needs access to the production facilities of the dominant firm. The question now is 
under what conditions, and against which terms, the dominant firm should be forced to share 
its facilities. 
 
The first essential facility cases that the Commission considered were related to physical 
infrastructure, harbours in particular. In these cases, a vertically integrated company that 
owned the facilities at a harbour A, also offered a ferry service between this harbour and 
harbour B. A competitor also wanted to offer ferry services between A and B, but, in order to 
do so, it needed access to the facilities at harbour A. Should the incumbent be forced to offer 
harbour services? If so, at what price? Cases that the Commission dealt with are, among 
others Sealink/B&I Holyhead  and Sea Containers Ltd. vs. Stena,  and in these it established 
the position that the integrated company was not allowed to discriminate between its own 
ferries and that of the competitor, hence, it should offer access. The first, non-infrastructure 
case in this domain was Magill  where broadcasting stations were not willing to hand over 
their programming data to a publisher who wanted to publish a complete programming guide. 
The ECJ argued that the refused to supply prevented a new product, for which there was 
apparent demand, from coming on the market, hence, that the refusal to supply constituted an 
abuse according to Article 82(b). 
 
These decisions have been criticized for being too interventionist and for eliminating firms’ 
incentives to invest. Quite interestingly, in these cases, the European Commission has made 
use of the so-called “essential facilities doctrine” that originates in the US, and that it has also 
been extensively criticized there, mainly for the fact that it deters investment both in existing 
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existence; see Areeda (1990).  
 
In a recent important essential facilities case, Bronner,  the ECJ has, however, taken a very 
much different attitude. In this case, the ECJ shows its awareness of the investment issue and 
it shows restraint in granting a competitor access to the facilities of a dominant firm. Bronner 
deals with a small newspaper company, with low circulation, that wants to get access to the 
nationwide distribution system of a larger competition. Bronner argues that its circulation is 
too small for it to have its own viable system, hence, that it should get access to the unique 
nationwide distribution system, that of its competitor. The ECJ, in essence argues that, given 
the current market shares, the claim might be true, but that this fact does not justify getting 
access. If Bronner would have an equal market share as the leading firm, then a nationwide 
distribution system would be viable from Bronner itself; hence, the competitor should not be 
forced to share. It has been argued in Bergman (2000)  that this Bronner-test constitutes a 
formidable hurdle for new entrants: it may simply not be feasible to reach a comparable 
market share within a reasonable time frame. It has also been argued, in Hancher (1999),  that, 
if the Commission would have adopted this stringent Bronner test in earlier cases, it would 
not have been able to come to the conclusion that access should be granted, as was the 
conclusion at the time. 
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Both the US and the EU know a system of merger control. Remarkably, in both jurisdictions, 
this instrument of structural control over the market was introduced only some 20 years after 
the first behavioural controls over business were introduced. While the Sherman Act dates 
from 1894, merger control was introduced in the US only in 1914. The EU came much later: 
laws prohibiting cartels and “regulating” dominant firms were introduced in 1958, while the 
EC Merger Regulation (ECMR) came into effect only in 1980. Already in 1966, the European 
Commission had remarked that, as both Article 81 and 82 deal with behaviour, it did not have 
a strong instrument to control essential changes in the structure of the market, and that a full 
system of merger control was needed to maintain effective competition in the common market 
and to reach the goals of the EEC Treaty.  As the change required unanimous approval by the 
Council and since different Member States had different views on what the goals of merger 
policy should be (and, in particular, about the role of industrial policy), it took 23 years until 
the ECMR was finally adopted. 
 
Indeed, it is an interesting question what the goals of merger policy should be. Two broad 
goals may be distinguished. Given the difficulties involved in constraining the behaviour of 
dominant firms, the main purpose of EC merger control seems to be to prevent dominant 
firms coming into existence. On the other hand, in the US, the main goals seems to be to 
prevent “anti-competitive” market structures. The differnce in emphasis leads to a different 
test: while the US authorities check whether a merger would lead to a significant lessening of 
competition, the European Commission verifies whether or not it would lead to a dominant 
position. In this section, we investigate the consequences of these different substantive tests, 
and we also briefly touch upon differences in procedures. 
 
  
6.1 Rules and procedures 
 
In the US, Section 7 of the Clayton Act, first enacted in 1914, controls mergers. It states that 
forbidden are acquisitions 
 
  “... where in any line of commerce or in any activity affecting commerce, in any 
section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen 
competition, or to tend to create a monopoly” (15 U.S.C. §18). 
 
The EC Merger Regulation (ECMR), which was adopted in 1989 and which came into force 
on 21 September 1990 states in Article 2(3):  
 
“3. A concentration which creates or strengthens a dominant position as a result of which 
effective competition would be significantly impeded in the common market or in a 
substantial part of it shall be declared incompatible with the common market.” 
 
We note that in the ECMR, dominance has the same meaning as in Article 82; hence, the 
definition was provided in the previous section. Of course, one important difference is that 
merger analysis is prospective, whereas Article 82 sees at the firm’s past behaviour. Also note 
that the substantive test in merger appraisal is a two-part test: the merger should create or 
strengthen a dominant position and, as a result of that, effective competition should be 
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position, but is nevertheless allowed, since it does not significantly impede competition. 
Furthermore, according to this test, mergers that significantly impede competition without 
creating or strengthening a dominant position should be allowed as well. The EU-test thus 
appears permissive: both conditions have to be satisfied for merger to be forbidden. In 
contrast, the Clayton Act states that mergers that substantially lessen competition or tend to 
create a monopoly are forbidden. In practise, since competition will usually be lessened 
already before monopoly is reached, cases in the US focus on “significant lessening of 
competition”, while in Europe the focus is on “dominance”.  
 
 
Firms that want to merge have to notify to the agencies that are responsible for those 
jurisdictions where the merger has effects. There are important procedural differences in the 
way merger notifications are handled in the US and in Europe. In the US, one has to notify to 
both the Federal Trade Commission and to the Antitrust Division of the Department of 
Justice. One of these agencies will handle the merger and will decide whether there is no 
anticompetitive effect and it can go through, or whether to file suit to prevent the merger from 
taking place. The US-system is an adversarial system. If the Antitrust Division wants to block 
a merger, it has to bring a court case, and the Court will weigh the arguments of the merging 
parties against those of the Department of Justice. In Europe parties notify to the European 
Commission, which investigates the case, which negotiates with parties to get remedies to 
relief competition concerns, and which decides to block the merger in case the latter are 
judged to be unsatisfactory. Consequently, the European Commission has a rather large 
discretionary power. 
 
In Europe, parties can appeal the Decision of the Commission, with the Court of First Instance 
(CFI), but it takes long before that Court will decide. For example, in Airtours,  the 
Commission blocked the merger in 1999, and it took 2 years before the CFI annulled that 
decision. Of course, the industry might have changed considerably during such a long period, 
and it is, hence, not too surprising that relatively few cases have been appealed, although as of 
recent, there is more activity, with also more cases being annulled by the CFI.  It has been 
argued that, as a consequence of these procedural differences, the European Commission 
faces less effective checks and balances and, therefore, has more room to fall prey to 
“demonstrably erroneous economic theory, and speculation contrary to the weight of the 
evidence”, this leading to a larger probability of mistaken decisions: see Patterson and 
Shapiro (2001). 
 
Patterson and Shapiro also point to the notable fact that, until recently, the European 
Commission has not been willing to commit itself by issuing guidelines on how it will 
evaluate mergers. In the US, the first merger guidelines were published in 1968, in Europe it 
took till the end of 2002 before the Commission published its first draft of the guidelines for 
horizontal mergers.  Remarkably, this draft shows a close resemblance to the US Merger 
Guidelines. 
 
The US Horizontal Merger Guidelines  
 
The Merger Guidelines describe the analytical framework and methodology used by the 
Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade Commission to determine whether a horizontal 
merger is likely substantially to lessen competition and, hence, should be challenged. The 
unifying theme of the Guidelines is that mergers should not be permitted to create or enhance 
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merger analysis: is the merger likely to create or enhance market power or to facilitate its 
exercise?  
 
In the first step, the relevant (affected) markets and the players on these markets are 
identified, and it is assessed whether the merger would significantly increase concentration. 
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index ("HHI") is used to measure market concentration and three 
broad regions are distinguished: unconcentrated markets (HHI below 1000), moderately 
concentrated markets (HHI between 1000 and 1800), and highly concentrated markets (HHI 
above 1800). In evaluating a merger, both the post-merger market concentration and the 
increase in concentration resulting from the merger are considered. If the post-merger market 
is moderately concentrated (resp. highly concentrated) and the merger increases the HHI by 
more than 100 (resp. more than 50) points, then the merger potentially raises competitive 
concerns, and should be investigated. In highly concentrated markets, it is presumed that 
mergers that increase the HHI by 100 points or more are likely to enhance market power. In 
all other cases, the Agency regards the merger as unlikely to have adverse competitive effects 
and ordinarily to require no further analysis. The authorities consider that market share and 
market concentration data may either understate or overstate market power, hence, the rule 
cannot be mechanical. A variety of other market characteristics (such as volatility of market 
shares, and the importance of innovation) are therefore considered. 
 
In the second step, it is studied whether the merger could have potential adverse competitive 
effects. Two channels through which a merger may harm competition are distinguished. First, 
a merger may diminish competition by making it easier for firms to coordinate their actions, 
hence, to collude either tacitly or overtly. To check whether this possibility is real, the 
authorities go over a checklist of market factors (“facilitating circumstances”) as in Section 4, 
in order to check whether it is possible for firms to coordinate and to discipline potential 
deviators. Here, also factors that would make such coordination more difficult, such as the 
existence of “maverick firms” are investigated. Secondly, as a merger eliminates one 
competitor from the market, it loosens a competitive constraint, and this may enable the 
merged firm (and indeed, in response also its competitors) to raise prices. This is the second 
channel through which a merger may diminish competition, the so-called unilateral effects: 
the merging firms may find it profitable to alter their behaviour unilaterally following the 
acquisition by elevating price and suppressing output. Of course, if competitors could easily 
substitute the offerings that, as a result of the merger, are withdraw from the market, then the 
competitive constraint will not be much loosened and there need not be much reason for 
concern. 
 
It is realized that a merger is not likely to create or enhance market power or to facilitate its 
exercise, if entry into the market is so easy that existing market participants could not 
profitably maintain a price increase above premerger levels. Such entry likely will deter an 
anticompetitive merger in its incipiency, or deter or counteract the competitive effects of 
concern. The third step of the analysis thus involves checking whether new market entry 
could counteract the competitive effects of concern. The Agency investigates whether entry is 
possible and likely, whether it would be timely and would be sufficient to return competition 
and market prices to their premerger levels.. 
 
In the fourth step, the Agency assesses any efficiency gains that reasonably cannot be 
achieved by the parties through other means than the merger. Here it is realized that 
efficiencies generated through merger can enhance the merged firm's ability and incentive to 
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making them a more effective competitor), which may result in lower prices, hence, higher 
consumer surplus. The Agency will thus investigate whether such efficiencies are likely to be 
achieved, and whether they are merger specific. Cognizable efficiencies are defined as 
merger-specific efficiencies that have been verified and do not arise from anticompetitive 
reductions in output or service. If such cognizable efficiencies likely would be sufficient to 
reverse the merger's potential to harm consumers in the relevant market, e.g., by preventing 
price increases in that market, then the Agency will not challenge the merger. 
 
Finally the Agency assesses whether, but for the merger, either party to the transaction would 
be likely to fail, causing its assets to exit the market. In such cases, the merger will have no 
effect on competition on the market, it is not likely to create or enhance market power or to 
facilitate its exercise, and can be allowed.  
 
Merger Appraisal in Europe 
 
 
Broadly speaking, the MTF (Merger Task Force) of the European Commission follows a 
similar procedure as outlined in the US guidelines, but there are important differences in the 
second and fourth step. Before turning to these differences, let us briefly discuss the elements 
of communality. In the first step, there is not much difference, certainly not in the way the 
relevant market is identified. The Commission also looks at ease of entry. Furthermore, the 
“failing firm defence” is also allowed in Europe. Recall that the ECMR specifies a two-part 
test: proscribed are  mergers that create a dominant position as a result of which competition 
is significantly impeded. It is possible that a merger creates or strengthens a dominant 
position, but is nevertheless allowed. Kali and Salz  or, more generally, any case in which a 
failing firm is taken over by a dominant firm, provides a real life example of this possibility: 
dominance is strengthened, but there is no significant effect on competition. For example, in 
Kali and Salz, the Court remarked 
 
“124. It follows from the foregoing that the absence of a causal link between the 
concentration and the deterioration of the competitive structure of the German market has not 
been effectively called into question. Accordingly, it must be held that, so far as that market is 
concerned, the concentration appears to satisfy the criterion referred to in Article 2(2) of the 
Regulation, and could thus be declared compatible with the common market without being 
amended.” 
 
On the other hand, the two-part test implies that, in Europe, mergers that significantly impede 
competition without creating or strengthening a dominant position should be allowed. As such 
mergers may well have negative consequences for welfare or consumer surplus, this may be 
considered undesirable. As a theoretical example of this possibility, think of a merger between 
the numbers two and three in a triopoly where the leader has 51 per cent of the market: 
competition is impeded, but no individually dominant firm is created or strengthened. It 
should thus be not surprising that the Commission has attempted to stretch its powers. In this 
specific case covered by this example, and indeed more generally, the Commission has done 
this by invoking the concept of “collective dominance”.  
 
In the remainder of this section, we first discuss this concept of collective dominance. Our 
discussion will lead to the conclusion, as also drawn by the Commission, that stretching 
“dominance” to “collective dominance” is not the way to go and that an alternative way is to 
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which the substantive merger test in the EU could be strengthened: 
 
i)  by dropping the reference to dominance, in which case the test would become very 
much like the SLC-test (significant lessening of competition) that is used in the US 
and, since recently, in the UK 
ii)   by dropping the reference to “competition being impeded”, in which case one would 
have a pure dominance test.  
 
After having discussed “collective dominance”, we will see that the Commission has recently 
proposed a third, and different, way to strengthen (or at least to clarify) the merger test from 
the ECMR. 
 
6.2 Collective Dominance 
 
We have already encountered this concept in the previous section. Note, however, that while 
Article 82 explicitly refers to a dominance position that may be held by one or more 
undertakings, there is no such reference in the EC merger test, hence, the question has arisen 
whether mergers that would create or strengthen situations of joint (or collective, or 
oligopolistic) dominance could be blocked: can mergers that produce tight oligopolies be 
forbidden? 
 
While the European Commission already argued in 1986 that, in its view, mergers creating 
collective dominant positions were forbidden by the Regulation , it took till 1998 before the 
ECJ clarified, in Kali and Salz  that collective dominance was caught by the Merger 
Regulation: 
 
“178. It follows from the foregoing that collective dominant positions do not fall outside the 
scope of the Regulation.” 
 
This decision, however, left unclear what situations would be classified under the label of 
collective dominance, in particular, what links (structural or economic) between the firms 
were needed for these to be able to adopt a common policy on the market. This is the issue 
that we have already visited in the previous section. Clarity was provided in Gencor,  a 
decision in which the CFI also referred to Flat Glass,  and used similar wordings as in that 
case, making it clear that collective dominance has the same meaning in merger cases as in 
abuse cases. In particular, in Gencor, the CFI made it clear that contractual links between 
firms are not necessary for these to be collectively dominant: it is sufficient for there to be a 
tight oligopoly in which tacit collusion is a possibility 
 
“276. Furthermore, there is no reason whatsoever in legal or economic terms to exclude from 
the notion of economic links the relationship of interdependence existing between the parties 
to a tight oligopoly within which, in a market with the appropriate characteristics, in particular 
in terms of market concentration, transparency and product homogeneity, those parties are in 
a position to anticipate one another’s behaviour and are therefore strongly encouraged to align 
their conduct in the market, in particular in such a way as to maximize joint profits by 
restricting production with a view to increasing prices. In such a context, each trader is aware 
that highly competitive action on its part designed to increase its market share (for example a 
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from its initiative. All the traders would thus be affected by the reduction in price levels.” 
 
Just as in the previous section, we can conclude that situations of tight oligopoly in which 
tacit collusion is feasible can carry the label “collective dominance”. Indeed, in paragraph 277 
of Gencor, the CFI explicitly states that the Commission should be able to control mergers in 
 
“market structures of an oligopolistic kind where each undertaking may become aware of 
common interests and, in particular, cause prices to increase without having to enter into an 
agreement or resort to a concerted practise”. 
 
Coordinated effects and the folk theorem 
 
The above description allows us to conclude that the coordinated effects that we encountered 
in the US Merger Guidelines are also covered by the ECMR, hence, in this domain the 
policies on the two continents should not be different, and the “checklist” from Section 4 
applies to both jurisdictions. The model (theorem) that underpins this checklist is the Folk 
Theorem from the theory of repeated games. Here we wish to stress, however, that the Folk 
Theorem only tells us that, in tight oligopolies, tacit collusion may be an equilibrium 
outcome; it does not tell us that firms will necessarily collude. The question, therefore, 
remains how to assess the likelihood of tacit collusion and whether, in situations where 
mergers might produce market structure that could be conducive to tacit collusion, it would 
not be preferable to be more permissive and to rely more on monitoring ex post and 
intervention through Article 82. Is, given the fact that tacit collusion can be caught by Article 





  In 1999, the British tour operator and supplier of package holidays Airtours wanted to 
acquire its competitor First Choice. It notified the transaction to the Commission, which 
decided to block the acquisition, as it would lead to a position of collective dominance on the 
UK market for package holidays. In its Decision, the Commission tried to stretch the notion of 
collective dominance: 
 
  “54 (...) [I]t is not a necessary condition of collective dominance for the oligopolists 
always to behave as if there were one or more explicit agreements (e.g. to fix prices or 
capacity, or share the market) between them. It is sufficient that the merger makes it rational 
for the oligopolists, in adopting themselves to market conditions to act-individually-in ways 
which will substantially reduce competition between them, and as a result of which they may 
act, to an appreciable extent, independently of competitors, customers and consumers.”  
 
  What is suggested in this passage (in particular by using the word “individually”) is 
that the ECMR could also be used to catch non-cooperative adaptation to the changed market 
conditions. The decision itself was, however, not completely clear on this, as it also went over 
the checklist from Section 4 of facilitating factors for tacit collusion, hence, in Airtours the 
Commission added confusion to the meaning of collective dominance. 
 
  Airtours appealed the Commission’s decision arguing both that the Commission had 
applied a new and incorrect definition of collective dominance and that it had erred in its 
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short-haul package holidays. In 2001, the CFI annulled the decision of the Commission, 
arguing that the Commission had not proved to the requisite legal standard that the 
concentration would give rise to a collective dominance position that would significantly 
impede effective competition.  In essence, the CFI argued that the characteristics of this 
market were such that tacit collusion was not very likely, or at least that the Commission had 
not argued convincingly that it was likely. The CFI, however, did not make any comments on 
the more fundamental point of whether “tight non-cooperative oligopolies” could be caught 
by the ECMR: “the Decision must be annulled, without it being necessary to examine the 
other complaints and pleas put forward by the applicant” (para. 295). 
 
  While there definitely is not enough space here to discuss the case in detail, it is 
worthwhile to mention some relevant aspects, so that the reader can form an opinion. 
 
  In Airtours, the Commission distinguishes two types of players on the relevant market, 
which is the market for short-haul package holidays: major tour operators that have market 
shares exceeding 10% and that are integrated both upstream (operation of charter airlines) and 
downstream (travel agencies), and secondary operators that have smaller market shares and 
that typically do not have their own charter airlines or travel agencies. The major companies 
account for about 80% of the market, divided as follows: Thomson: 27%, Airtours: 21%, 
Thomas Cook: 20%, First Choice: 11%. Note that with an HHI of over 1800 and an increase 
in HHI of over 400, the US authorities would start the analysis of this case with a presumption 
of market power being enhanced. On the other hand, the post-merger market share of 32% 
would not lead one to conclude that Airtours/First Choice would be dominant. Indeed, the 
Commission did not argue the case on single firm dominance, but on grounds of collective 
dominance; see para. 58 of the Decision. 
 
  Let us go over the checklist of factors facilitating tacit collusion, as mentioned in 
Section 4: how likely is tacit collusion? In the words of the CFI “Is it possible for the three 
major companies that remain after the merger to adopt a common policy on the market?”. In 
para. 62, the CFI writes:  
 
“(...) three conditions are necessary for a finding of collective dominance as defined: 
first, each member of the dominant oligopoly must have the ability to know how the other 
members are behaving in order to monitor whether or not they are adopting the common 
policy (...) There must, therefore, be sufficient market transparency for all members of the 
dominant oligopoly to be aware, sufficiently precisely and quickly, of the way in which the 
other member’s market conduct is evolving; 
 
second, the situation of tacit coordination must be sustainable over time, that is to say, there 
must be an incentive not to depart from the common policy on the market (...) The notion of 
retaliation in respect of conduct deviating from the common policy is thus inherent in this 
condition (...) for a situation of collective dominance to be viable, there must be adequate 
deterrents to ensure that there is a long-term incentive in not departing from the common 
policy (...); 
 
third, to prove the existence of a collective dominant position to the requisite legal standard, 
the Commission must also establish that the foreseeable reaction of current and future 
competitors, as well as of consumers, would not jeopardize the results expected from the 
common policy.” 
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These conditions are broadly in line with the checklist from Section 4: tacit collusion requires 
that the players can monitor each others actions, so that they can detect deviations from the 
common policy; that they can punish deviations, so that deviating is not profitable; and that 
there are entry barriers, so that outsiders cannot make tacit coordination unprofitable by 
undercutting. 
 
In its plea, Airtours argued that, in this specific market, none of these conditions was satisfied. 
First of all, while the Commission argued that the market involved relatively homogeneous 
product, Airtours argued that there is a lot of product heterogeneity, for example there are 50 
holiday destinations and 20 airports of departure in the UK, hence 1000 combinations (and 
even many more different hotels) and these have different characteristics. The product 
heterogeneity makes coordination difficult and the market intransparant. Secondly, demand 
for holiday trips is volatile and demand is difficult to forecast at the point in time when 
capacity is planned, which is 18 months in advance of the season, hence, this also contributes 
to intransparency and makes monitoring difficult. Thirdly, because capacity is planned well in 
advance, retaliation cannot be quick and as a consequence, it is unlikely that deviation from 
the common policy can be deterred. Finally, Airtours argued that barriers to entry and barriers 
to expansion for smaller players were low: if the dominant players would tacitly collude and 
restrict hotel capacity, then the smaller players could easily expand, by making more bookings 
and by making more seat reservations with competing airlines. As a result, tacit collusion 
could not succeed. 
 
The CFI reviewed these arguments and concluded that the Commission made various errors 
of assessment the market (predictability and volatility of demand, and the degree of market 
transparency), that it wrongly concluded firms could easily coordinate, that it erred in finding 
that there was a sufficient incentive for a member of the dominant oligopoly not to depart 
from the common policy, and that the Commission exaggerated the importance of entry 
barriers. As a result of these findings, the CFI was forced to annul the Commission’s 
Decision. 
 
6.3 SLC or dominance: does it make a difference? 
 
The above discussion has made clear that the ECMR catches mergers that create situations of 
single or collective dominance. However, these situations are not the only ones in which 
effective competition may be significantly impeded: in an oligopolistic situation, a merger 
may considerably reduce consumer surplus also if it does not lead to coordinated behaviour. It 
seems that, thus far, the Merger Regulation did not catch such mergers and it might be argued 
that this is undesirable. In 2000, the European Commission published a green paper with 
which it consulted, among others, whether and how the substantive test of the ECMR should 
be strengthened deal with such situations.  In particular, the question was asked whether the 
EC should switch and also adopt the SLC-test that is being used in the US. Following this 
consultation, on 11 December 2002, the European Commission proposed a far-reaching 
reform of its merger control regime in which, among others, it proposes a New Regulation in 
order to indeed strengthen its substantive merger test. Before discussing the test proposed by 
the Commission, we now discuss whether the test would make a difference.  
 
European Commissioner Monti has suggested that the exact substantive test, or at least the 
wording of it does not make much difference. As illustrative evidence, he has pointed to the 
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in cases such as GE/Honeywell, the conflict was not the result of the tests being different, but 
of the facts of the case being interpreted in a different way on different sides of the Atlantic 
(also see below). We would like to argue that the tests are very different and that the EC-test 
is really too weak. Of course, this value judgement relates to the goal one assigns to merger 
control. In our view, the goal of merger control should not simply be to prevent dominant 
positions being attained, but rather to prevent market structures in which competitive forces 
are too weak. The essence of merger control is to prevent mergers that would result in market 
structures in which competition would be significantly impeded. We remark that this is also 
the position taken by the European CFI. In Gencor v. Commission , the Court writes: 
 
“106 (…) while the elimination of the risk of future abuses may be a legitimate concern of 
any competent competition authority, the main objective in exercising control over 
concentrations at Community level is to ensure that the restructuring of undertakings does not 
result in the creation of positions of economic power which may significantly impede 
effective competition in the common market. Community jurisdiction is therefore founded, 
first and foremost, on the need to avoid the establishment of market structures which may 
create or strengthen a dominant position, and not on the need to control directly possible 
abuses of a dominant position.” 
 
In our view, the dominance test is too weak    to adequately deal with “non-cooperative 
tight oligopolies” and, for this reason, changing to the SLC-test would be desirable. At the 
same time we, however, note that the European Commission has a great deal of discretionary 
power, and that implementation of policy is already imperfect at the moment. The vagueness 
of the SLC-test, and the associated possible loss of some relevant (constraining) case law, 
would give the EC greater power to intervene than it currently has, hence, switching to the 
SLC-test might exacerbate the problems resulting from a too interventionist Commission. In 
fact, one might argue that this is an argument for retaining the current test. After all, the 
current test asks both the creation or strengthening of a dominant position and this to lead to 
competition being significantly impeded; it thus imposes a strict standard. 
 
The proposal for a revised EC Merger Regulation 
 
If, as we argue here, the essence of merger control is to prevent market structures in which 
competition would be significantly impeded and if the current ECMR is insufficiently 
powerful for this purpose, there seems an easy fix to the problem: it suffices to simply 
eliminate the reference to dominance in Article 2 of the current Merger Regulation, hence, the 
text would become: 
“3. A concentration as a result of which effective competition would be significantly impeded 
in the common market or in a substantial part of it shall be declared incompatible with the 
common market.” 
 
In the proposal for a new ECMR , the Commission has not taken this route, although that it 
stresses, just like we do, that it should also able to tackle “non-cooperative mergers” in 
oligopolistic settings. Instead of deleting the word dominance from the ECRM, the 
Commission proposes to redefine the term. Specifically, the Commission proposes to add a 
new Article 2 to the Regulation, in which “dominance” is redefined as 
 
“2. For the purpose of this Regulation, one or more undertakings shall be deemed to be in a 
dominant position if, with or without coordinating, they hold the economic power to influence 
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quality of output, distribution or innovation, or appreciably to foreclose competition.” 
 
Although the Commission remarks, in recital 56 of the proposed Regulation, that this 
proposed definition closely follows the characterization of a dominant position given by the 
Court, we are not entirely convinced by this. It seems to us that, since the concept is stretched 
to also include situations in which oligopolists do not coordinate their behaviour, adopting 
this Proposal by the Commission will have the consequence that dominance will come to 
mean something different in merger cases than it does in abuse cases, unless, of course, the 
concept of “oligopolistic dominance” would be stretched in these cases as well. As our 
discussion in the previous section has shown, such a strengthening would, however, be both 
unnecessary and undesirable. Given the decisions of the Court in cases such as Airtours, we 
also believe that the European CFI would be unwilling to stretch the definition in that 
direction. 
 
Given that the Commission thus proposes in effect to adopt a different definition in merger 
cases than in abuse cases, we prefer to do away with dominance in merger cases altogether. In 
order to deal with the problem of discretion referred to above, we advocate using Merger 
Guidelines, just as is done in the US, and we are pleased that, as part of its comprehensive 
reform process, the Commission has indeed published draft guidelines for the appraisal of 
horizontal mergers.    This notice is structured around the same five steps that we have 
encountered in the US Guidelines, with as additional element that buyer power is explicitly 
taken into account as well. While there are certain differences between these EU Guidelines 
and the US Guidelines (for example, the Commission states it is unlikely that it will challenge 
mergers with a HHI below 1000, where the “safe haven” in the US is somewhat more 
generous), in broad strokes, with the exception, possibly of the treatment of efficiencies, one 
may state that there is agreement between the two, at least as far as methods of analysis is 
concerned. Consequently, the Draft Commission Notice in effect describes that the 
Commission will be performing an SLC–test. 
 
Perhaps this is not that surprising, as it has been claimed that the Commission may also in the 
past have been using this test. Whish (2001), for example, notes that, in Carrefour/Promodes  
the combined market share of the merging firms share stood at less than 30% and that still the 
merger was prohibited. Consequently, it is possible that, in some past merger cases, the 
Commission would have found dominance, where it would not so have concluded, had the 




  The second substantive issue on which the Commission’s Green Paper invited views 
was the treatment of efficiencies in merger control. The Commission has frequently been 
criticized for not having a transparent policy with respect to this issue and, in the present 
consultation process, many respondents argued in favour of treating efficiency claims more 
explicitly. The Commission, however, decided not to honour these requests; in the proposal 
for the new ECMR, it writes that it is legally possible to deal with efficiency issues under 
Article 2(1) (b) of the ECMR, and consequently, the proposal is to leave this aspect 
unchanged. Article 2(1) (b), however, gives some rather general considerations, it states, 
among others, that, in making the merger appraisal, the Commission shall take into account 
“(...) the development of technical and economic progress provided that it is to consumer’s 
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commentators have, therefore, argued that Article 2(1) (b) of the ECMR is not the proper 
place to incorporate efficiencies and that these should be taken into account in the substantive 
test, that is in the Article 2(3) and 2(4) of the Regulation. We are of the same opinion, but, if 
our analysis in the previous section is correct, then the issue is more semantic than of 
substance. This reading is also supported by the chapter on Efficiencies in the Draft 
Commission Notice on the appraisal of horizontal mergers. There we read, in paragraph 88 
 
“The Commission considers any substantiated efficiency claim in the overall assessment of 
the merger. It may decide that, as a consequence of the efficiencies that the merger brings 
about, this merger does not create or strengthen a dominant position as a result of which 
effective competition would be significantly impeded. This will be the case when the 
Commission is in a position to conclude on the basis of sufficient evidence that the 
efficiencies generated by the merger are likely to enhance the incentive of the merged entity 
to act pro-competitively for the benefit of consumers, by counteracting the effects on 
competition which the merger might otherwise have.” 
 
  On the face of it, this description does not seem to be different from the way 
efficiencies are handled in the US and one would hope that the Commission would adopt a 
similar position also in mergers that are not purely horizontal (see below). Of course, the 
Commission is right to insist, as it does in the Draft Commission Notice, that the efficiencies 
that the merging parties claim are verifiable, substantial, timely, merger-specific and of direct 




  We conclude from the above that, on paper, it looks that in the future the EU merger 
policy will be very much like the policy in the US, hence, that there will be little scope for 
conflict. In the past, however, there has been conflict: in 2001, the US and EU competition 
authorities reached diametrically opposed conclusions in the proposed merger of General 
Electric with Honeywell; while this merger was unproblematic for the US authorities , it was 
blocked by the European Commission.  We conclude this Section by briefly discussing this 
important case: how to explain that different conclusions were reached?  
 
  The essence of the European Commission’s argument for blocking the merger was 
that, through packaged offers, the merged entity would be able to charge lower prices and, 
hence, to foreclose competitors from the market. At the same time, the US authorities viewed 
these efficiencies that the merged company was able to obtain as being pro-competitive. To 
appreciate these arguments, some background information on the players involved and the 
markets on which they are active is needed. 
 
  General Electric is a widely diversified industrial corporation, with revenues 
exceeding $ 125 billion in 2001. In the area of aviation, with which this case is concerned, it 
produces aircraft engines and it holds a dominant position on several of such engine markets. 
Through a joint venture with the French company CFMI, for example, it exclusively supplies 
engines for Boeing’s B737. Competitors on this market are Pratt & Whitney (P&W) and Rolls 
Royce (RR). Honeywell is a leading avionics and technology firm, with revenues of about 
$23 billion in 2001, of which half came from its aerospace division. Give the breadth of 
activities of both these companies, there was a remarkable lack of overlap in their aircraft 
activities, consequently, the usual horizontal market power issues (elimination of a 
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case were not of major concern. Instead, the focus was on “conglomerate effects”.  
 
The European Commission claimed that, by combining the dominant position of GE in the 
aircraft engines markets with the leading position of Honeywell in several avionics markets, 
the merged company would be able to offer product packages at discount prices that rivals 
would not be able to match, and that as a result of that, these rivals would exit, thus leading to 
a strengthening of the dominant position of GE. In making this argument, the Commission 
also gave an important role to the financial strength of GE, as derived from its financial arm, 
GE Capital, and, in particular its important role in the purchasing, leasing and financing of 
aircraft. The following excerpts from the Decision illustrate the Commission’s concerns: 
paragraphs 351-355 of the Decision 
  
“353. As a result of the proposed merger, the merged entity will be able to price its packaged 
deals in such a way as to induce customers to buy GE engines and Honeywell BFE and SFE-
option products over those of competitors, thus increasing the combined share of GE and 
Honeywell on both markets.” 
 
“355. (...) the merged entity’s packaged offers will manifest their effects after the merger goes 
through. Because of their lack of ability to match the bundle offer, these [i.e. the competing, 
VCRvD] component suppliers will lose market shares to the benefit of the merged entity and 
experience an immediate damaging profit shrinkage. As a result, the merger is likely to lead to 
market foreclosure on those existing aircraft platforms and subsequently to the elimination of 
competition in these areas.  
 
To an economist, these arguments definitely do not suffice to block the merger: the goal of 
merger control is not to protect (inefficient) competitors. In fact, in this case, the Commission 
itself acknowledges that the costumers will benefit from the discount, but it is also worried 
that, by engaging in short term cost cutting, these customers will ultimately harm themselves:  
 
“449. Airlines generally welcome the financial incentives that come with bundled offers. 
Given the very nature of their competitive environment, airlines are under great pressure in 
the short-term to keep their costs under control. Therefore, while airlines are likely to 
understand that their long-term interests would be better served through the preservation of 
competition among suppliers, each individual airline also has, and is likely to pursue, a short-
term interest in achieving costs savings through bundled offerings.” 
 
  What is at issue here is the really fundamental question of the extent to which one can 
rely on markets being self-correcting: the more one is a market believer, the less one will be 
inclined to think that there will be a conflict between the short-term and the long-term. 
Related to that, should one act on the assumption that government officials are better able to 
take the long-term interests of costumers into account than these costumers themselves? 
Interestingly, in this case, the costumers were not opposed to the merger, but the competitors 
(RR in particular) forcefully made the above point. Why would one block a merger from 
which consumers do benefit? As pointed out already in the Introduction, in the US there is, 
generally, a stronger belief in the market than in the EU and, indeed, in the US, the same 
arguments led to the conclusion that the merger should be allowed, since it would lead to 
lower prices, and, hence, benefit consumers.  In other words, in the US, the efficiencies 
obtained through the merger were considered as a pro, while in Europe, they were considered 
as a con.  
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  The economist comparative advantage lies in his knowledge of the functioning of 
markets. He is trained not to believe in markets, but to evaluate them on their merits. While an 
antitrust economist may not have detailed knowledge of the markets relevant in this specific 
case, he may bring to bear models that allow one to get a better feeling for the forces that play 
a role. What about to make of the above arguments? Can the fears of the European 
Commission be substantiated? 
 
As is known already from the work of Cournot, a merger of firms that active in 
complementary product lines, may allow them to reduce price, since, after the merger, they 
internalise externalities. Given price competition, competitors will follow by also reducing 
price, hence, overall prices will fall and consumers will benefit in the short run. What about 
the long run? Theory here is less developed and one has to rely more on intuition, aided by 
stylised ad hoc models that capture some relevant aspects of this case. If the merged entity is 
much more efficient than its competitors, then it might drive them from the market, and, 
theoretically, one could imagine that the firm might engage in foreclosure practises in order to 
speed up this process. Consequently, strengthening of dominance seems possible, but even in 
those cases, the welfare effects are ambiguous: the merger confers short-term benefits on 
consumers, while the long term effects are ambiguous, i.e. they depend on the model that is 
adopted. From an economic point of view, is that sufficient to block a merger? It hardly seems 
so. 
  
In this specific case, a model  was constructed in support of the argument of the competitors 
and the relevance of that model to the case at hand and for the decision to be taken was 
discussed extensively . In the Decision, the European Commission summarizes the role of 
economic analysis as follows:    
 
  “352. (…) The Commission has evaluated the theoretical premises of mixed bundling 
as presented to it in the economic analyses submitted by the parties and thirds parties. The 
various economic analyses have been subject to theoretical controversy, in particular, as far as 
the economic model of mixed bundling, prepared by one of the third parties, is concerned. 
However, the Commission does not consider the reliance on one or the other model necessary 
for the conclusion that packaged deals that the merged entity will be in a position to offer will 
foreclose competition from the engines and avionics/non-avionics markets. 
 
  In our view, the fact that one cannot rely on one or the other model does not imply that 
one should not take the lessons of these models to heart and that one can base one’s decision 
on one’s instincts. 
 
7. Research agenda 
 
This section sums up the discussion of this chapter. It does so by identifying research gaps in 
the various fields of interest.  
 
1.  The most striking and important research gap lies in empirical work on dominance. 
There is substantial empirical work on mergers, i.e. the consequences of mergers, but 
lots of other useful empirical work is needed, but lacking. In the light of the fact that 
judges require strong empirical foundation, the economic profession falls short of 
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number of fields where empirical contribution will be helpful:  
 
a.  Importance of entry barriers. Entry barriers play a vital role in dominance 
issues, but there is hardly any clue how to assess the importance of entry 
barriers in a quantitative way. 
b.  Factors driving collective dominance (tacit collusion). Section 4 introduced a 
classification of market structure characteristics (necessary ingredients, 
important factors and other factors). The practical usefulness of this 
classification can be enhanced if it can be backed up with empirical work. 
c.  Assessment of government failure. From economic theory we know that 
government intervention is associated with social costs. It would be good if 
empirical studies are conducted that assess the importance of government 
failure under various market structural characteristics. 
 
2.  Role of  experiments 
 
One of the reasons that empirical studies have not yet generated strong detailed 
conclusions about the functioning of markets is that they need to measure a wealth of 
variables. Some of these variables, such as firms’ cost structure and demand conditions, 
may be hard to measure. Moreover, economists have hardly control over the relevant 
variables. An environment in which the researcher is not confronted with these problems 
is the research laboratory. In the laboratory, subjects are confronted with oligopoly games 
of which the researcher knows the characteristics. Even better: the researcher has full 
control over these characteristics. Therefore, laboratory experiments can help to gain 
insights in the functioning of markets. This is in particular useful in assessing the 
importance of certain market structural characteristics, such as symmetry, transparency, 
the number of firms, pre-play communication and the like. There is already some 
experimental work on some of these issues




This chapter focused on economic analysis of dominance and government responses to 
anti-competitive conduct and mergers. Economists often ignore the practical problems that 
governments have when implementing policies. While there is a growing literature on 
implementation issues, such as pricing rules, leniency programs, agency problems and 
fighting facilitating practices, the development of (applicable) theory is in its early stages 
and much more can be done. 
  
4.  Applied theory on abuse 
 
There are recent developments in the literature on predation, foreclosure, raising rivals 
costs and essential facilities, but much more can be done here as well. It would be 
particularly useful to study the relationship between certain market structural 
characteristics and the potential for the various types of abuse. 
 
5.  Ex ante versus ex post 
 
                                                 
96 See Canoy and Onderstal (2003), Chapter3, for some recent references. 
  63There are a number of overview articles discussing the relative merits of ex ante versus ex 
post intervention.  Indeed, our section 2 also provides some general insights on this 
discussion. What is still lacking, though, are more concrete studies on this issue. One can 
think of international comparisons between markets which are regulated in one country 
but left to the competition law in another. One can think of markets that faces a shift in 
regime (typically from sector specific regulation into competition law). Another idea is to 





                                                 
97 See M. Cave et al (2002) for an example in the telecommunications sector. 





Abreu, D. (1986), “Extremal Equilibria of Oligopolistic Supergames,” Journal of Economic 
Theory, 39:191-223. 
Abreu, D., D. Pearce and E. Stachetti (1985), “Optimal Cartel Equilibria with Imperfect 
Monitoring,” Journal of Economic Theory, 39:251-269. 
Aghion, P. and J. Tirole (1997), “Formal and Real Authority in Organizations,” Journal of 
Political Economy 105:1-29. 
Bain, J. (1948), “Output Quotas in Imperfect Cartels,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
62:617-622. 
Berges-Sennou, F., F. Loss, E. Malavolti-Grimal and T. Vergé (2001), “Competition Policy and 
Agreements Between Firms,” University of Bristol CMPO Working Paper 01/034. 
Bernheim, D. and M. Whinston (1990), “Multimarket Contact and Collusive Behavior,” Rand 
Journal of Economics, 21. 
Brock, W.A. and J. Scheinkman (1985), “Price Setting Supergames with Capacity 
Constraints,” Review of Economic Studies, 52:371-382. 
Compte, O. and P. Jehiel (2002), “Multi-party negotiations,” mimeo, CERAS. 
Compte, O., F. Jenny and P. Rey (2002), “Capacity Constraints, Mergers and Collusion,” 
European Economic Review, 46(1):1-29. 
Crémer, J. (1995), “Arm’s-length Relationships,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 2:275-295. 
D'Aspremont, C. and M. Motta (1994), “Tougher Price Competition or Lower Concentration: 
A Trade-off for Antitrust Authorities,”  Université Catholique de Louvain, Discussion 
Paper n° 9415. 
Davidson, C. and R.J. Deneckere (1984), “Horizontal Mergers and Collusive Behavior,” 
International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2:117-132. 
Davidson, C. and R.J. Deneckere (1990), “Excess Capacity and Collusion,” International 
Economic Review, 31:521-541. 
Dewatripont, M., and J. Tirole (1995) “Advocates,” Journal of Political Economy 107(1):1-
39. 
Evans, W.N. and I.N. Kessides (1994), “Living by the ‘Golden Rule’: Multimarket Contact in 
the U.S. Airline Industry,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109:341-366. 
Gertner, R. (1994), “Tacit Collusion with Immediate Responses: The Role of Asymmetries,” 
mimeo, University of Chicago. 
  65Green, E. and R. Porter (1984), “Non-Cooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price 
Information,” Econometrica, 52:87-100. 
Haltiwanger, J. and J. Harrington (1991), “The impact of cyclical demand movements on 
collusive behavior,” Rand Journal of Economics, 22:89-106. 
Harrington, J. (1989), “Collusion Among Asymmetric Firms: The Case of Different Discount 
Factors,” International Journal of Industrial Organization, 7: 289-307 
Ivaldi, M., B. Jullien, P. Seabright, P. Rey and J. Tirole (2003), The Economics of Tacit 
Collusion, Report for the European Commission.  
Jullien, B. and P. Rey (2002), “Resale Price Maintenance and Collusion,” mimeo, University 
of Toulouse. 
Klemperer, P. (2002), “How (Not) to Run Auctions: the European 3G Telecom Auctions,” 
European Economic Review, 46 (4-5): 829-845. 
Kühn K.U. (2001): “Fighting collusion by regulating communication between firms,” 
Economic Policy, 32:169-204. 
Lambson, V.E. (1987), “Optimal Penal Codes in Price-Setting Supergames with Capacity 
Constraints,” Review of Economic Studies, 54:385-397. 
Lambson, V.E. (1994), “Some Results on Optimal Penal Codes in Asymmetric Bertrand 
Supergames,” Journal of Economic Theory, 62:444-468. 
Lambson, V.E. (1996), “Optimal Penal Codes in Nearly Symmetric Bertrand Supergames 
with Capacity Constraints,” Journal of Mathematical Economy, forthcoming. 
Martin, S. (1993), “Endogenous Firm Efficiency in a Cournot Principal-Agent Model”, 
Journal of Economic Theory, 59:445-50. 
Martin, S. (1995), “R&D Joint Ventures and Tacit Product Market Collusion,” European 
Journal of Political Economy, 24:357-379. 
Mason, C.F., O.R. Phillips and C. Nowell (1992), “Duopoly Behavior in Asymmetric 
Markets: an Experimental Evaluation,” Review of Economics and Statistics, 662-670. 
Motta, M. and M. Polo (2000), “Leniency Programs and Cartel Prosecution,” mimeo, 
available at available at http://www.iue.it/Personal/Motta/.Osborne, M., and C. Pitchik 
(1983), “Price Competition in a Capacity-Constrained Duopoly,” Journal of Economic 
Theory, 38:238-260. 
Neven, D., R. Nuttall and P. Seabright (1993) Merger in Daylight, London:CEPR. 
Osborne, M., and C. Pitchik (1983), “Price Competition in a Capacity-Constrained Duopoly,” 
Journal of Economic Theory, 38:238-260. 
  66Parker, P.M. and L.-H. Röller (1997), “Oligopoly and the Incentive for Horizontal Merger,” 
American Economic Review, 75:219-227. 
Pénard, T. (1997), “Choix de Capacités et Comportements Stratégiques : une Approche par 
les Jeux Répétés,” Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, 46:203-224. 
Porter, R. (1983), “A Study of Cartel Stability: The Joint Executive Committee, 1880-1886,” 
Bell Journal of Economics, 14:301-314. 
Raith, M. (1996), “Product Differentiation, Uncertainty and the Stability of Collusion,” 
London School of Economics-STICERD Discussion Paper Series EI/16:49. 
Ross, T. W. (1992), “Cartel Stability and Product Differentiation,” International Journal of 
Industrial Organization, 10:1-13. 
Rotemberg, J., and G. Saloner (1986), “A Supergame-Theoretic Model of Business Cycles 
and Price Wars during Booms,” American Economic Review, 76:390-407. 
Schmalensee, R. (1987), “Competitive Advantage and Collusive Optima,” International 
Journal of Industrial Organization, 5:351-368. 
Selten, R. (1984), “Are Cartel Laws Bad for Business?,” in Operations Research and 
Economic Theory, Hauptmann, Krelle and Mosler eds, Berlin/Heidelberg: Springer-
Verlag. 
Snyder, (1996), “A Dynamic Theory of Countervailing Power,” Rand Journal of Economics, 
27:747-769. 
Spagnolo, G. (2000a), “Optimal Leniency Programs,” mimeo, Stockholm School of 
Economics.  
Spagnolo, G. (2000b), “Self-Defeating Antitrust Laws: How Leniency Programs Solve 
Bertand's Paradox and Enforce Collusion in Auctions,” mimeo, Stockholm School of 
Economics. 
Stigler, G. (1964), “A Theory of Oligopoly,” Journal of Political Economy, 72:44-61. 
Sutton, J. (1991), Sunk Cost and Market Structure, Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Sutton, J. (1998), Technology and Market Structure, Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Symeonidis, G. (1999), “Are Cartel Laws bad for Business? Evidence from the UK,” mimeo, 
University of Essex. 
Tirole, J. (1988), The Theory of Industrial Organization, MIT Press. 
 
 
 
  67